Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
847 opinions found
In re Quintilya Thomas
COA08
In an original proceeding arising from family-law temporary orders, the relator asked the El Paso Court of Appeals for an emergency stay of “default temporary orders” but filed only a Rule 52.10 motion and no petition for writ of mandamus. The court treated the defect as jurisdictional: under Tex. R. App. P. 52.1 an original proceeding is commenced only by filing a mandamus petition, and Rule 52.10 temporary relief is merely ancillary and is available only after a petition invokes the court’s original jurisdiction. Because no petition was on file, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to grant any temporary relief or stay and dismissed the motion for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice to refiling after a mandamus petition is filed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you need an emergency stay from a court of appeals in a family case, you cannot file a standalone “emergency stay pending mandamus” motion. File the mandamus petition first (or simultaneously) to invoke original jurisdiction; only then can Rule 52.10 temporary relief be considered—otherwise the motion will be dismissed and valuable time will be lost while temporary orders remain enforceable."
Jackey Raylorn Martin v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Jackey Raylorn Martin v. State, the defendant challenged the trial court’s pretrial ruling designating a forensic interviewer as the child-victim “outcry” witness under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072, arguing the wrong outcry witness was selected. The Amarillo Court of Appeals focused first on error preservation, holding that a pretrial outcry/admissibility ruling is only preliminary and does not preserve appellate complaint; to preserve error, the defendant had to object again when the designated outcry witness actually testified before the jury. Because no contemporaneous objection was made at trial, the issue was waived under Texas preservation rules. In the alternative, the court held that even if the designation were incorrect, any error was harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) because the same key substance (penetration and identity) came in through other, unobjected-to evidence, including SANE/medical testimony and corroborating DNA evidence. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pretrial evidentiary wins don’t preserve anything by themselves: if you want appellate review, renew objections when the testimony/exhibit is offered at trial and get a clear ruling. And even a proven evidentiary mistake may not matter if the same core facts come in through other sources—so (1) object consistently across channels if you need harm, and (2) build redundant, independent proof if you’re the proponent."
Blevins v. Brown
COA07
In Blevins v. Brown, a plaintiff filed suit for slander and tortious interference but failed to include specific factual details regarding the alleged defamatory statements. After the defendant filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff attempted to file an amended petition on the day of the hearing to cure the defects. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict between the general amendment provisions of Rule 65 and the specific requirements of Rule 91a.5(c), determining that the specific three-day deadline for Rule 91a amendments is mandatory and supersedes general rules. The court held that the trial court properly refused to consider the late amendment and affirmed the dismissal, ruling that defamation claims lacking specific factual predicates constitute legally baseless 'threadbare recitals.'
Litigation Takeaway
"Precision is paramount when pleading 'crossover' torts like defamation in family law; you must provide specific facts—the who, what, when, and where—in your petition and remember that the Rule 91a amendment window closes strictly three days before the hearing."
Adam Horwitz v. City of Denton, et al.
COA02
In this case, Appellant Adam Horwitz attempted to appeal interlocutory orders granting a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss. Horwitz filed his notice of appeal nearly three months after the orders were signed, mistakenly believing that his filing of a motion for new trial extended the appellate deadline to 90 days, a belief reinforced by the trial court's docket labeling the orders as 'Final.' The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and 28.1, which stipulate that accelerated appeals from interlocutory orders must be filed within 20 days and are not extended by motions for new trial. The court held that because the orders did not dispose of all parties and claims, they were interlocutory, the 20-day deadline applied, and the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on a Motion for New Trial to extend your appellate deadlines for interlocutory orders. In accelerated appeals—common in family law for jurisdictional disputes or temporary injunctions—you must file your notice of appeal within 20 days of the signature, or you risk losing your right to appeal entirely."
Luis Noguera v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Luis Noguera v. The State of Texas, the defendant attempted to exercise his statutory 'absolute' right to sever consolidated criminal charges on the morning of trial. Despite having six months' notice of the State's intent to try the cases together, the defense failed to file a pretrial motion and instead raised the issue orally just before jury selection. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the request under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which treats severance as a pretrial pleading. The court held that because the request was not raised pretrial, it was untimely, and the trial court did not err in denying it despite the mandatory nature of the underlying right.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never wait until the morning of trial to invoke 'mandatory' procedural rights like severance, bifurcation, or separate trials. Even absolute entitlements are subject to timeliness requirements; if you fail to raise these issues in writing during the pretrial phase, you likely waive the right and fall into a preservation trap that appellate courts will not rescue."
Ex Parte Giambi Boyd
COA01
In Ex Parte Boyd, a defendant was held for 560 days on a $1.2 million bond for murder and aggravated assault charges. Despite the severity of the crimes, the State admitted it was not ready for trial because forensic firearms testing was still pending. The First Court of Appeals analyzed Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that a felony defendant must be released on a personal bond or have their bail reduced to an affordable amount if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days of detention. The court held that this statute is mandatory and does not permit a "safety exception" for dangerous offenses. Consequently, because the defendant proved he could only afford a $5,000 bond, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and ordered the bail reduction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not rely on the criminal justice system to keep a violent or dangerous party incarcerated during a family law case; if the State isn't ready for trial within 90 days, the party may be released on a nominal bond regardless of the charges. Family law practitioners must proactively secure civil Protective Orders and restrictive temporary orders to ensure the safety of their clients and children."
Raven Robert Rodriguez v. State
COA11
Raven Robert Rodriguez was convicted of capital murder following the stabbing death of his long-term partner. On appeal, Rodriguez argued that the trial court erred by failing to limit the definitions of 'intentionally' and 'knowingly' in the jury charge and by admitting evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence against the victim. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that while the jury charge was technically erroneous, it did not result in egregious harm given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the defendant's admission and surveillance footage. Crucially, the court upheld the admission of prior domestic violence incidents, finding them relevant to establishing the nature of the relationship and the defendant's pattern of conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"To successfully prove a pattern of domestic violence in family law cases, practitioners should prioritize objective corroboration—such as surveillance video, medical records, and photos—to supplement testimony. When prior acts of violence against the same partner are well-documented, they are highly admissible to establish context and risk, and appellate courts are unlikely to reverse such findings even if technical instructional errors occur at trial."
In the Interest of A.R. and C.R., Children
COA10
In this parental termination case, a mother’s court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, asserting that the appeal was frivolous, and simultaneously moved to withdraw from the case. The Tenth Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record and agreed that there were no arguable grounds for reversal, affirming the termination decree. However, the court denied the attorney’s motion to withdraw. Relying on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in In re P.M., the court concluded that a parent’s statutory right to counsel persists through the exhaustion of all appellate remedies, including the filing of a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. Therefore, an attorney cannot withdraw simply because the appeal is deemed meritless at the intermediate stage.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas parental termination cases, the right to court-appointed counsel is a "long-tail" obligation; even if an attorney believes an appeal is meritless, they must generally remain on the case until the client has had the opportunity to seek review from the Texas Supreme Court."
City of Houston v. Pellott
COA14
In City of Houston v. Pellott, a plaintiff sued the city under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) but failed to specifically plead that timely statutory notice was provided to the governmental unit. The City moved for dismissal under Rule 91a, arguing the petition lacked a basis in law because it failed to allege this jurisdictional prerequisite. Although the plaintiff provided evidence in a response suggesting that notice had actually been sent and received, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused strictly on the pleadings. The court analyzed the case under the Harris County v. Sykes doctrine, which requires dismissal with prejudice when a party fails to cure a jurisdictional pleading defect after being given multiple opportunities to replead. The court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion and rendered a judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"When suing a governmental entity—whether for incidents involving CPS, school districts, or police during possession exchanges—pleading statutory notice in your petition is a jurisdictional requirement, not a suggestion. You cannot rely on external evidence or 'actual notice' to save a case if your formal pleadings are defective; if you fail to fix the petition after a challenge, the court can dismiss your claim permanently with prejudice."
In the Interest of K.A.E.E. and K.M.-A.E., Children
COA10
The Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate parental rights following incidents of domestic violence and substance abuse. Despite being offered relocation assistance and shelter services, the mother chose to return to an abusive environment with the father and violated a court-ordered safety plan. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), emphasizing that endangerment occurs when a parent prioritizes an abusive relationship over a stable environment, even without evidence of actual injury to the child. The court held that the parents' continued association and rejection of safety resources constituted clear and convincing evidence to support termination and the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination proceedings, a parent's affirmative decision to reject domestic violence resources and return to an abuser in violation of a safety plan is potent evidence of endangering conduct, as 'endangerment' does not require a child to suffer actual physical injury."