Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
862 opinions found
In the Interest of K.A.B., a Child
COA05
In this SAPCR modification appeal, the mother argued the trial court violated due process by enforcing equal one-hour time limits that prevented her from fully testifying and offering additional exhibits. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that trial courts have broad discretion to impose reasonable, evenhanded trial limits, and the record showed the limits were applied equally, the mother was warned as her time expired, and she chose to spend her allotted time on cross-examination rather than her own affirmative proof. The court also emphasized preservation: the mother did not timely object to the time limits, did not make an offer of proof showing what excluded testimony or exhibits would have established, and did not preserve hearsay complaints by contemporaneous objection. Because the complaints were waived or inadequately briefed, and no abuse of discretion appeared on the record, the court affirmed the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family court imposes trial time limits, object early, explain specifically why more time is needed, and make an offer of proof for any excluded testimony or exhibits. On appeal, preservation usually matters more than generalized fairness complaints."
L. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In L. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Austin Court of Appeals held that under the 2023 amendments to Texas Family Code § 161.001, a DFPS-filed termination case requires more than proof of a predicate ground and best interest: the trial court must also make a separate written finding, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent. The court examined the decree and the record, which showed DFPS created a tailored service plan, referred and paid for services, arranged individual and family therapy, maintained contact, provided visitation, and pursued relative placement with reunification in mind. Rejecting the mother’s argument that the efforts were not reasonable, the court emphasized that the statute requires reasonable efforts, not successful reunification, and deferred to the trial court’s adverse credibility finding against the mother. The court held the written findings were sufficiently specific and that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the reasonable-efforts finding, so it affirmed the termination decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If reunification efforts matter, build and document them with specificity. For DFPS and child’s counsel, L.G. shows that a detailed service plan, therapy referrals, payment for services, visitation, contact logs, and relative-placement efforts can satisfy § 161.001(f). For parent-side counsel, broad complaints about unfair services are not enough—challenge the fit, accessibility, timing, and execution of the services in real time and preserve those issues in the trial court."
Weger v. Bradley
COA06
In Weger v. Bradley, a post-divorce property dispute arose over whether a receiver’s sale transferred only the 0.59-acre tract at 202 Banks Drive or also a separate 0.49-acre tract at 0 Banks Drive. The appellees argued the receiver had authority to sell both parcels, relying on the enforcement order, a later nunc pro tunc order attaching legal descriptions, and a correction deed. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that even assuming the receiver had authority, the summary-judgment evidence created a genuine fact issue about what property was actually included in the sale. The original deed, contract, title documents, purchase price, and escrow evidence pointed only to 202 Banks Drive, so traditional summary judgment was improper. The court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In post-decree real-estate enforcement cases, proving authority to sell is not enough—you must also prove the disputed parcel was actually included in the transaction that closed. If the decree, receiver order, deed package, title file, and consideration do not all match, a fact issue can defeat summary judgment."
Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas v. The City of Austin and Austin Transit Partnership Local Government Corporation
SCOTX
In Paxton v. City of Austin, the Texas Supreme Court addressed a trial court’s refusal to rule on the Attorney General’s plea to the jurisdiction after the opposing parties openly urged the court to withhold a ruling so they could avoid an interlocutory appeal and automatic stay under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8). The Court held that because no written order granted or denied the plea, the court of appeals correctly concluded it lacked interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. But the Court also held that a trial court cannot defeat a governmental unit’s statutory appellate rights by deliberately refusing to rule on a properly presented jurisdictional plea. Mandamus was therefore appropriate to compel the trial court to rule, and appellate courts may either treat a premature appeal as a mandamus petition or abate the appeal and direct the trial court to issue a ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court cannot use a non-ruling to block appellate review of a threshold jurisdictional challenge. If the court refuses to rule on a properly presented plea to the jurisdiction—especially to avoid an interlocutory appeal or stay—build a clear record and seek mandamus to force a ruling."
Gopalan v. Marsh
SCOTX
In Gopalan v. Marsh, a jury found that the father had the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence, but the trial court’s decree awarded the mother about 57% of the possession time. The Texas Supreme Court analyzed Family Code section 105.002, the broader conservatorship statutes, and the ordinary meaning of “primary residence,” concluding that the term means the place where the child lives most of the time. Because the decree gave majority possession to the non-designating parent, it contravened the binding jury verdict. The Court reversed and remanded the possession order, related best-interest determinations on parental rights and duties, and the appellate attorney’s fee award, while otherwise affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a jury awards your client the exclusive right to designate a child’s primary residence, the final decree cannot give the other parent the majority of possession time. In Texas jury-tried conservatorship cases, lawyers must align the possession schedule with the primary-residence finding, preserve objections to any inconsistent decree, and recognize that possession errors can unravel related rulings on support, parental rights, and fees."
Downstream Investments, LLC v. Krcmar
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals reversed a traditional summary judgment that had voided a land-sale contract based on the seller’s alleged mental incapacity. The court held that contractual incapacity is judged at the time of execution, and although the guardian offered strong evidence of the seller’s stroke-related cognitive deficits, later medical evaluations, and later guardianship findings, that evidence did not conclusively prove she lacked capacity when she signed the contract. Because affidavit testimony from the realtor supported a reasonable inference that the seller understood the nature and effect of the transaction, a genuine fact issue remained and the case had to be remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you are attacking or defending a family-law agreement on incapacity grounds, the key evidence must be tied to the exact time the document was signed. Later guardianship orders, diagnoses, or generalized proof of cognitive decline may be persuasive, but they will not support traditional summary judgment if there is transaction-specific evidence that the person understood the deal when it was made."
In re David J. Alarid
COA06
In In re Alarid, the Texarkana Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief without reaching the merits because the relator failed to provide a proper Rule 52 mandamus record. The court found that some attached documents were neither certified nor sworn, some materials appeared not to have been filed in the trial court, and the Rule 52.3(k) certification did not properly state that the petition’s factual assertions were supported by competent evidence in the appendix or record. Strictly enforcing Rules 52.7 and 52.3(k), the court held that these record defects were fatal and denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus can be lost on procedure alone. In family-law emergency and contempt matters, lawyers must ensure every material document filed below is included as a certified or sworn copy, exclude convenience exhibits that were not filed in the trial court, and use Rule 52.3(k) certification language that tracks the rule exactly. A strong merits argument will not save a defective mandamus record."
Wood v. Wood
COA14
In Wood v. Wood, the parties’ premarital agreement and later MSA treated certain Schedule F retirement accounts as separate property to be divided equally, and their MSA required binding arbitration of disputes over drafting a decree that conformed to the agreement. When a dispute arose over decree language and use of a QDRO service to implement the retirement-account division, the wife argued the arbitrator exceeded his authority and substantively redivided property. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that the arbitrator acted within the scope of the MSA’s drafting-arbitration clause because the dispute submitted was how to implement the agreed division in the decree. The court further held that directing QDRO-related procedures was a permissible implementation mechanism, not an unlawful recharacterization or divestiture of separate property, and affirmed denial of vacatur under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 171.088(a)(3)(A).
Litigation Takeaway
"If an MSA sends decree-drafting disputes to binding arbitration, that authority can extend beyond mere wording disputes to the practical mechanics needed to carry out an agreed property division—especially with retirement assets. Lawyers should draft arbitration clauses carefully, spell out whether implementation issues like QDROs are included, and preserve any vacatur complaints precisely in the motion to vacate."
Rodriguez v. State
COA11
In Rodriguez v. State, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that Article 38.37, section 2(b) permits evidence of an extraneous child-sex offense even when the extraneous victim is a different child from the complainant in the charged case. The defendant, charged with indecency with a child involving G.T., challenged the admission of testimony from K.N. about an earlier alleged sexual assault, arguing the evidence was too dissimilar, unfairly prejudicial, and unconstitutional under Article 38.37. The court relied on prior authority, especially Wishert, to reject any same-victim limitation in the statute, held that the statute survived both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges because of its procedural safeguards, and concluded the trial court acted within its discretion after conducting the required hearing and Rule 403 balancing. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, Rodriguez is a strong crossover authority for the proposition that alleged sexual misconduct toward one child can be relevant to assessing risk to another child. In custody, modification, and protective-order cases, do not assume allegations lose force just because the child in suit is different; instead, expect courts to consider cross-child conduct as part of a broader safety and protective-capacity analysis, while still litigating reliability, corroboration, and proportionality."
In re Gentri Renee McLean
COA11
In In re McLean, the Eleventh Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court could temporarily transfer the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence from the mother to the father in a pending modification suit. The father relied on evidence that the mother had denied visitation, the children had school absences, and the mother tested positive for cocaine. The court held that Family Code section 156.006(b)(1) requires more than proof of parental misconduct or decree violations; the movant must show that the children’s present circumstances would significantly impair their physical health or emotional development. Because the record lacked child-focused evidence tying the complained-of conduct to present significant impairment, the temporary modification was legally insufficient. The trial court therefore abused its discretion, and mandamus relief was conditionally granted.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want temporary orders changing primary custody in Texas, you need proof of present, child-specific significant impairment—not just evidence that the other parent is obstructive, irresponsible, or tested positive for drugs. Denied visitation may support enforcement, but it does not automatically justify a temporary change of primary residence."