Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
862 opinions found
In the Interest of B.E.S.D. and T.D.G., Children
COA11
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in the best interest of the children under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The court reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and applied the nonexclusive Holley factors, emphasizing that the same evidence supporting predicate endangerment grounds can also support best interest. The court focused on the mother’s repeated marijuana use during multiple pregnancies, repeated positive drug tests at childbirth, long CPS history, prior removals, domestic violence, instability, and failure to make lasting changes despite services. As to the father of B.E.S.D., the court likewise held that his refusal to cooperate, role in the unsafe environment, and conduct supporting the predicate findings also supported best interest. The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pattern matters. Texas courts may infer future danger from a parent’s past conduct, and a best-interest finding does not fail just because every Holley factor was not proved. In family-law cases involving conservatorship, modification, or supervised possession, lawyers should build the record chronologically around recurring substance abuse, domestic violence, instability, noncompliance, and failure to benefit from services—not isolated incidents."
Jonathan Edward Norton v. The State of Texas
COA10
In Norton v. State, the appellant challenged a six-year prison sentence imposed after revocation of community supervision as grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. The Tenth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because Norton never objected when sentence was pronounced and never raised the constitutional complaint in a motion for new trial or other post-trial filing. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a)(1) and preservation authorities, the court held that constitutional disproportionality complaints are waived unless timely and specifically presented to the trial court. The revocation judgment and sentence were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you believe a ruling or punishment is constitutionally excessive, say so in the trial court—clearly, specifically, and on the record. Norton is a preservation case: even serious constitutional complaints, including disproportionality, due-process, or punitive-sanctions arguments, can be lost on appeal if counsel does not object at the hearing and, when appropriate, re-urge the issue in a post-judgment motion."
In re Gentri Renee McLean
COA11
In In re McLean, the Eleventh Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court could temporarily transfer the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence from the mother to the father in a pending modification suit. The father relied on evidence that the mother had denied visitation, the children had school absences, and the mother tested positive for cocaine. The court held that Family Code section 156.006(b)(1) requires more than proof of parental misconduct or decree violations; the movant must show that the children’s present circumstances would significantly impair their physical health or emotional development. Because the record lacked child-focused evidence tying the complained-of conduct to present significant impairment, the temporary modification was legally insufficient. The trial court therefore abused its discretion, and mandamus relief was conditionally granted.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want temporary orders changing primary custody in Texas, you need proof of present, child-specific significant impairment—not just evidence that the other parent is obstructive, irresponsible, or tested positive for drugs. Denied visitation may support enforcement, but it does not automatically justify a temporary change of primary residence."
In the Interest of Z.S., Z.S., M.S. III, Children
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence clearly and convincingly showed endangerment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The court relied on severe unsanitary living conditions, untreated medical issues, exposure to sexual-abuse risk, domestic violence, and ongoing parental drug use during the case. It analyzed endangerment cumulatively, holding that the parents knowingly allowed the children to remain in dangerous surroundings and engaged in a continuing course of conduct that jeopardized the children’s physical and emotional well-being. The children’s improvement in their maternal grandmother’s placement further supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are won or lost on the full pattern of danger, not one isolated event. Evidence of filthy home conditions, unsafe caregivers, domestic violence, drug use, poor visitation conditions, and lack of meaningful change after services can support termination—and in non-termination family cases, the same facts can justify supervised possession, sole conservatorship, or other protective restrictions."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Michael Adam Nelson and Jhoelayne Paixao Nelson and in the Interest of M.P.N. and M.A.P.N., Children
COA13
After the parties’ divorce decree was signed, one side sought sanctions and the other later filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship. The trial court ruled on the sanctions dispute, but the modification case remained pending. Applying Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held the sanctions order was not final because it did not dispose of all pending claims and parties, and it lacked clear and unequivocal finality language. Because no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal from the sanctions order, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a post-divorce sanctions order can be appealed by itself. In family-law cases, appellate finality depends on whether all live claims in the case have been resolved, including later-filed modification proceedings. Before filing a notice of appeal, check the full docket and consider severance if you need a stand-alone final judgment."
Linh Hong Dang v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Dang v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a party cannot complain on appeal about excluded testimony unless the party made an offer of proof or the substance of the testimony was otherwise apparent from the record. The appellant argued the trial court wrongly excluded testimony about alleged law-enforcement pressure on the complainants’ mother, her alleged desire to pay attorney’s fees, and impeachment evidence about inconsistent timing of the alleged abuse. The court concluded the first two complaints were not preserved because counsel did not make an offer of proof and the missing testimony was not clear from context. On the timing issue, the court held the trial court acted within its discretion because counsel failed to satisfy the Rule 613 predicate for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement. With no preserved evidentiary error, the cumulative-error argument also failed, and the judgments were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the judge excludes testimony, do not stop at 'objection sustained.' Make an immediate offer of proof, state why the evidence is admissible, and, if using prior inconsistent statements, lay the full Rule 613 foundation. In family-law cases built on credibility, bias, coaching, motive, or inconsistent timelines, an unpreserved exclusion issue is usually dead on appeal."
In the Interest of J.S.C. and J.M.C., Children
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show Father engaged in his own endangering course of conduct. Father argued the case turned on whether he knew about Mother’s drug use and neglect, but the court rejected that framing because subsection (E) was supported by Father’s independent conduct: repeated incarceration, methamphetamine use and related criminal charges, avoidance of the Department due to active warrants, refusal to begin services, and prolonged absence from the children’s lives. The court also rejected Father’s argument that conduct before formal paternity adjudication could not count, concluding that knowledge of paternity is not required when the parent had reason to believe he was the father and avoided involvement. The termination judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In endangerment cases, courts look at the parent’s overall pattern of instability—not just one bad act and not just the other parent’s misconduct. Repeated jail exposure, drug use, avoidance of CPS, failure to pursue paternity, and staying absent from the child’s life can together support termination and, by analogy, strong conservatorship and possession restrictions in other family-law cases."
Victor Hugo Prado v. The State of Texas
COA01
In this injury-to-a-child appeal, the court rejected challenges to Prado’s convictions based on jury unanimity, legal sufficiency, and accomplice-witness corroboration, holding that commission and omission were alternative manner-and-means, that the evidence of prolonged malnourishment, visible injuries, deprivation, and Prado’s control over the children’s environment was sufficient to prove knowing or intentional injury by omission, and that independent testimony and documentary evidence adequately corroborated the mother’s testimony. The court did, however, agree that because both convictions arose from a single criminal action, duplicative court costs could not be imposed in both judgments under article 102.073, so it modified one judgment to delete those costs and affirmed as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"For Texas family-law cases, this opinion is a strong roadmap for proving endangerment through omission, not just direct abuse. A parent or paramour who controls the home and knowingly fails to feed, protect, or obtain care for a child can be framed as dangerous based on pattern evidence from daycare workers, relatives, photos, records, and other third parties. It also reminds lawyers to build corroboration beyond one compromised household witness and to audit multiple orders for duplicative cost or fee assessments."
Wood v. Wood
COA14
In Wood v. Wood, the parties’ premarital agreement and later MSA treated certain Schedule F retirement accounts as separate property to be divided equally, and their MSA required binding arbitration of disputes over drafting a decree that conformed to the agreement. When a dispute arose over decree language and use of a QDRO service to implement the retirement-account division, the wife argued the arbitrator exceeded his authority and substantively redivided property. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that the arbitrator acted within the scope of the MSA’s drafting-arbitration clause because the dispute submitted was how to implement the agreed division in the decree. The court further held that directing QDRO-related procedures was a permissible implementation mechanism, not an unlawful recharacterization or divestiture of separate property, and affirmed denial of vacatur under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 171.088(a)(3)(A).
Litigation Takeaway
"If an MSA sends decree-drafting disputes to binding arbitration, that authority can extend beyond mere wording disputes to the practical mechanics needed to carry out an agreed property division—especially with retirement assets. Lawyers should draft arbitration clauses carefully, spell out whether implementation issues like QDROs are included, and preserve any vacatur complaints precisely in the motion to vacate."
Ex parte Brayden Channing Coin
COA02
In Ex parte Brayden Channing Coin, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed denial of Article 11.072 habeas relief from a guilty plea to sexual assault. Coin argued his lawyer was ineffective for failing to investigate whether the charged conduct occurred before he turned seventeen, which would have undermined adult-court jurisdiction under Penal Code section 8.07(b), and he also claimed that bad advice made his plea involuntary. The court held those claims failed because the habeas court was entitled to credit trial counsel’s evidence that Coin personally admitted post-seventeen assaults, that counsel discussed the significance of his age, and that Coin chose a probation-focused plea strategy. Given those supported credibility findings, additional investigation into conflicting timing evidence such as the Fortnite release issue would not have changed the result, a jurisdictional challenge was not shown to be meritorious, and Coin could not show under Hill v. Lockhart that he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Credibility findings can decide the whole case. If the trial court credits evidence that a party was advised of the key issue, understood the stakes, and made a strategic choice anyway, later claims of bad advice, poor investigation, or involuntary agreement usually fail. For family lawyers, the lesson is to build a record of admissions, advice given, informed consent, and multiple timeline anchors so the trial court’s findings will survive appeal."