Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
862 opinions found
Victor Hugo Prado v. The State of Texas
COA01
In this injury-to-a-child appeal, the court rejected challenges to Prado’s convictions based on jury unanimity, legal sufficiency, and accomplice-witness corroboration, holding that commission and omission were alternative manner-and-means, that the evidence of prolonged malnourishment, visible injuries, deprivation, and Prado’s control over the children’s environment was sufficient to prove knowing or intentional injury by omission, and that independent testimony and documentary evidence adequately corroborated the mother’s testimony. The court did, however, agree that because both convictions arose from a single criminal action, duplicative court costs could not be imposed in both judgments under article 102.073, so it modified one judgment to delete those costs and affirmed as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"For Texas family-law cases, this opinion is a strong roadmap for proving endangerment through omission, not just direct abuse. A parent or paramour who controls the home and knowingly fails to feed, protect, or obtain care for a child can be framed as dangerous based on pattern evidence from daycare workers, relatives, photos, records, and other third parties. It also reminds lawyers to build corroboration beyond one compromised household witness and to audit multiple orders for duplicative cost or fee assessments."
Falah Algaissi v. Taima Abu Qamer
COA02
In Algaissi v. Abu Qamer, the husband appealed a final divorce decree, challenging conservatorship, property division, and fraud findings. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that his challenges failed for two independent reasons: he did not timely secure the reporter’s record, so the court presumed the evidence supported the trial court’s rulings, and he personally signed the decree as “approved and consented to as to both form and substance,” which made the decree an agreed judgment. Applying invited-error and agreed-judgment principles, the court concluded he could not attack the very provisions he had consented to absent proof that his consent was not genuine. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not treat decree signature language as boilerplate. If a client may appeal, avoid signing a divorce decree as approved or consented to as to both form and substance, because that can waive challenges to custody, property, and fraud rulings. Also, timely secure the reporter’s record—without it, most family-law abuse-of-discretion complaints are effectively lost."
Ryan Tolle v. Perth Tolle
COA14
In this pre-September 1, 2023 Texas SAPCR modification case, the father sought to modify conservatorship but his Rule 194 disclosures merely repeated the statutory standards of material and substantial change and best interest without identifying any underlying facts. The court held that former Rule 194.2(b)(3) required a general factual narrative supporting the claim, not just boilerplate legal conclusions. Because the suit was filed in 2022, the old disclosure rules applied despite a later amended petition. After the father failed to show good cause or lack of unfair surprise under Rule 193.6, the trial court properly excluded his modification evidence, and with no evidence left on essential elements, properly granted a directed verdict against him.
Litigation Takeaway
"In legacy family cases filed before September 1, 2023, disclosures must tell the factual story behind a modification claim. If you only recite statutory buzzwords like material and substantial change or best interest, the court can exclude your evidence and your case may be over before it reaches the factfinder."
Rodriguez v. State
COA11
In Rodriguez v. State, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that Article 38.37, section 2(b) permits evidence of an extraneous child-sex offense even when the extraneous victim is a different child from the complainant in the charged case. The defendant, charged with indecency with a child involving G.T., challenged the admission of testimony from K.N. about an earlier alleged sexual assault, arguing the evidence was too dissimilar, unfairly prejudicial, and unconstitutional under Article 38.37. The court relied on prior authority, especially Wishert, to reject any same-victim limitation in the statute, held that the statute survived both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges because of its procedural safeguards, and concluded the trial court acted within its discretion after conducting the required hearing and Rule 403 balancing. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, Rodriguez is a strong crossover authority for the proposition that alleged sexual misconduct toward one child can be relevant to assessing risk to another child. In custody, modification, and protective-order cases, do not assume allegations lose force just because the child in suit is different; instead, expect courts to consider cross-child conduct as part of a broader safety and protective-capacity analysis, while still litigating reliability, corroboration, and proportionality."
Patrick McNeal v. The State of Texas
COA05
In McNeal v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant who pleaded guilty under a plea bargain could pursue an appeal after receiving the exact agreed sentence. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2), the court treated the case as a restricted plea-bargain appeal and examined whether any exception allowed review. The record showed no written pretrial motion ruled on before trial, no trial-court permission to appeal, and no statutory authorization for the appeal. Because the trial court’s certification stated McNeal had no right of appeal and the record supported that certification, Rule 25.2(d) required dismissal. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a related criminal case resolves through a negotiated plea and the defendant receives the bargained-for sentence, an appeal may be barred unless counsel preserved a written pretrial issue, obtained permission to appeal, or fits within a statute authorizing review. For family-law cases involving family violence or other criminal overlap, do not build strategy around the assumption that a later criminal appeal will undo the collateral effects of the plea."
In re LOH Elkhart, LLC d/b/a Elkhart Oaks Care Center, Live Oak Healthcare, LLC, Senior Living Properties, LLC, SLP Management Holdings, LLC, and LOH Management, LLC
COA12
In this mandamus proceeding, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a party cannot revive a case dismissed for want of prosecution by filing an unverified motion to reinstate and later trying to supply Rule 306a proof after the trial court’s plenary power has expired. The plaintiff’s case was dismissed, and her later motion to reinstate alleged lack of notice but was not verified and did not state the date she first received notice or actual knowledge of the dismissal order. The court strictly applied Rules 165a and 306a, explaining that a verified motion is required to extend plenary power and that delayed-notice relief requires a sworn Rule 306a(5) motion proving the date of first notice or actual knowledge. Because those requirements were not timely met, the trial court’s plenary power expired before it signed the reinstatement order, making that order void. Mandamus relief was therefore proper.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your family-law case gets DWOP’d, lack of notice alone does not save you. To extend deadlines, you must promptly file a verified motion and, if relying on delayed notice, strictly comply with Rule 306a(5) with sworn proof of the exact date notice or actual knowledge was first received. If the other side gets a reinstatement order without a verified Rule 165a motion or proper Rule 306a proof, that order may be void and vulnerable to mandamus."
In the Interest of S.M.S., a Child
COA12
In this SAPCR conservatorship appeal, a pro se appellant challenged a trial court order naming multiple nonparents as joint managing conservators and raised twenty-three appellate issues, including standing and jurisdiction complaints. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the appellant’s brief failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1: it listed issues but provided no meaningful record citations, no supporting authority, and no developed legal analysis. Applying settled law that pro se litigants are held to the same briefing standards as attorneys, the court held that inadequately briefed complaints are waived and affirmed the conservatorship order in full.
Litigation Takeaway
"On appeal, even potentially strong family-law issues are lost if they are not tied to the record, legal authority, and a developed argument. For appellants, Rule 38.1 compliance is essential; for appellees, inadequate briefing can be a powerful path to affirmance without reaching the merits."
Austin G. Croom v. Casey L. Croom
COA05
In Croom v. Croom, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a divorce decree unambiguously awarded the wife a continuing one-half share of the parties’ present interest in AP Capital, separate from a separate $397,000 equalization judgment. Reading the decree as a whole, the court rejected the husband’s argument that the AP Capital award had been monetized and absorbed into the equalization payment merely because the asset’s value was used in the divorce balance-sheet calculations. The court concluded that “present interest” meant the community’s ownership stake at divorce, not just its then-current dollar value, and that the decree’s language awarding rights and privileges “past, present, or future” confirmed the wife’s entitlement to later sale proceeds attributable to that interest. Because the husband kept and spent those proceeds after AP Capital sold its asset, the evidence supported liability for civil theft, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. The court affirmed the substantive judgment but reversed and remanded the attorney’s-fees award.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree separately awards a spouse an ownership interest in a business asset, do not assume a separate equalization payment buys that interest out unless the decree expressly says so. Draft decrees with precision: say whether the spouse gets the asset itself or a cash buyout, and if future distributions are intended to follow ownership, say that clearly. In enforcement, a spouse who pockets post-divorce proceeds from property awarded to the other spouse may face not just enforcement remedies, but tort and civil-theft exposure."
In re Ahmed Ahmed
COA12
In a SAPCR-related mandamus proceeding, Ahmed challenged the trial court’s denial of his plea to the jurisdiction. The Tyler Court of Appeals denied relief because Ahmed failed to provide a Rule 52.7-compliant mandamus record. Although he claimed no testimony was taken at the hearing, that assertion was disputed and he admitted he was not present, so the court could not verify what occurred below. Without authenticated materials showing the nature of the hearing and any relevant testimony, the court could not evaluate whether he had established a clear abuse of discretion and entitlement to mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus can fail even when the underlying complaint may have merit if the relator does not bring a complete, authenticated Rule 52.7 record. In family-law cases, always secure and file the reporter’s record, material pleadings, orders, and proof of whether testimony was or was not taken before seeking emergency appellate relief."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Angela Zesiger and Bryan Zesiger
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a Texas trial court could enforce and clarify a divorce decree awarding a former spouse one-half of the military retirement benefits accrued during marriage. After Bryan retired, the trial court converted Angela’s formula-based share of disposable retired pay into a monthly dollar amount, included cost-of-living adjustments, entered an arrearage judgment, and ordered execution of payment paperwork. On appeal, Bryan argued federal law preempted the order, but the court rejected that argument because the USFSPA expressly allows state courts to divide and enforce disposable retired pay, and the order did not reach non-disposable pay or interfere with disability-waiver rights protected by Mansell and Howell. The court further held that expressing the already-awarded share in monthly terms was a permissible clarification under Texas Family Code Chapter 9, not an impermissible modification of the property division.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree validly awards a share of disposable military retired pay, Texas courts can later clarify the formula into a monthly amount, include COLAs, and award arrears without violating federal law—so long as the court is enforcing the original division rather than redividing property or reaching disability-waived/non-disposable pay."