Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
847 opinions found
Jay Morgan v. The State of Texas
COA03
Jay Morgan appealed his conviction for indecency with a child, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing. Morgan’s motion was based on a post-trial affidavit from his ex-fiancée, who claimed she had recanted her incriminating statements to investigators before the trial but was told she did not need to testify. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether the affidavit established "reasonable grounds" for relief, concluding it was too conclusory and failed to demonstrate why the evidence could not have been presented at trial with reasonable diligence. The court also held that the complainant’s testimony was legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict, affirming the conviction with a minor clerical modification.
Litigation Takeaway
"A post-trial "recantation" affidavit is not an automatic ticket to a new hearing; to reopen a case or set aside an order, the moving party must show the new evidence is specific, material, and could not have been discovered earlier through reasonable diligence."
Pesca Holding LLC v. Skoldeberg
COA04
In Pesca Holding LLC v. Skoldeberg, a jury trial was held regarding alleged fraud in a business sale. Although the defendants prevailed on the liability claims, they failed to include a question about attorney’s fees in the jury charge. The trial court, believing an informal agreement to bifurcate the issues existed, later convened a second jury trial specifically for fees. On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals analyzed whether a party waives attorney's fees by failing to submit them to the initial factfinder. The court held that because attorney’s fees are questions of fact for the jury, they are waived unless the record contains a clear and unambiguous bifurcation agreement, such as a written Rule 11 agreement. Finding no such agreement in the record, the court reversed the $800,000 fee award and rendered a take-nothing judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on an informal or "handshake" agreement to handle attorney’s fees after a jury trial; if the fee question isn't in the jury charge and you don't have a signed Rule 11 agreement to bifurcate, you waive your right to fees the moment the jury is discharged."
Shamsa v. Reagan
COA05
In Shamsa v. Reagan, a homeowner who acquired her property via a divorce decree sued her neighbor for adverse possession over a disputed boundary strip. The neighbor argued the homeowner lacked standing because the divorce decree contained a scrivener's error in the legal description of her own lot. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed constitutional standing, concluding that the right to assert title via adverse possession depends on the claimant's actual appropriation of the disputed land, not the perfection of the record title to their adjacent property. The court held that Reagan had standing and title to the strip, but reversed the award of attorney’s fees because Texas law does not provide a statutory basis for fees in adverse possession suits.
Litigation Takeaway
"Clerical errors in a divorce decree's property description do not automatically strip a party of the right to sue third parties for land ownership; however, clients should be prepared to bear their own legal costs in adverse possession cases as attorney's fees are generally not recoverable."
Gary D. Pickens v. City of Greenville, Texas
COA05
In Pickens v. City of Greenville, a plaintiff filed a mandamus action under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA) after a city failed to respond to multiple record requests. After the suit was filed, the parties entered into a Rule 11 settlement agreement where the City 'voluntarily' produced the records. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiff's request for mandatory attorney's fees and dismissed the case as moot. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that to 'substantially prevail' under Texas Government Code § 552.323(a), a plaintiff must obtain judicially sanctioned relief—such as a court order or judgment—that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties. Because the production was secured via a contract (Rule 11) rather than a judicial mandate, the plaintiff did not meet the prevailing party standard.
Litigation Takeaway
"To recover attorney's fees in a Public Information Act mandamus action, do not accept a 'voluntary' production via a Rule 11 agreement. You must secure a signed court order or an agreed final judgment that explicitly compels the production of documents to ensure your client qualifies as a 'prevailing party.'"
In re Brandon Charles Cole
COA05
Relator Brandon Charles Cole filed a petition for writ of mandamus after the trial court denied his motions to recuse in two related cases. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the petition on both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, the court found the Relator failed to provide a sworn or certified record of the trial court proceedings as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7. Substantively, the court applied Texas Supreme Court precedent holding that a denial of a motion to recuse does not satisfy the 'no adequate remedy by appeal' requirement for mandamus relief. The court held that because the recusal issue can be raised on appeal following a final judgment, mandamus intervention is unavailable, and the petition was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot use a mandamus petition to immediately overturn a judge's refusal to recuse themselves; instead, you must proceed to trial and reserve the issue for a standard appeal after the final decree. Furthermore, any attempt at mandamus requires a strictly certified or sworn record—procedural errors alone are sufficient for the appellate court to dismiss your petition."
In re Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.
COA05
In a commercial vehicle accident case, the employer (Old Dominion) challenged a discovery order requiring the production of personnel records for two of the driver's supervisors. Old Dominion argued that because it had stipulated to respondeat superior liability (vicarious liability) and sought bifurcation, the records were irrelevant to the remaining issues. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the request under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3, finding that because the plaintiff also pleaded direct corporate negligence and gross negligence, the documents—specifically training records, evaluations, and job descriptions—were relevant to proving the company's 'conscious indifference.' The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the order was narrowly tailored, included privacy protections, and sought information relevant to institutional culpability that a vicarious liability stipulation does not resolve.
Litigation Takeaway
"A party's stipulation to one form of liability does not serve as a 'discovery kill switch' for evidence related to other pleaded theories. Narrowly tailored discovery into supervisor training, performance, and knowledge remains discoverable to prove 'conscious indifference' or direct corporate misconduct, even when vicarious liability is conceded."
Joseph Christopher Cole v. The State of Texas
COA12
In Joseph Christopher Cole v. The State of Texas, the Twelfth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court can assess court-appointed attorney’s fees against a defendant who had previously been found indigent. The court analyzed Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 26.04(p), which establishes a legal presumption that a party found indigent remains so for the remainder of the proceedings unless a "material change" in financial circumstances occurs. Because the record lacked any affirmative evidence that the defendant’s financial status had improved, the court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order reimbursement. Consequently, the appellate court modified the trial court's judgment to delete the assessment of attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"The "once indigent, always indigent" presumption is a powerful shield; if you seek to recover court-appointed fees or ad litem costs from a party previously declared indigent, you must proactively build an evidentiary record demonstrating a "material change" in their financial resources before the final judgment is entered."
In re Brandon Charles Cole
COA05
In this original proceeding, Relator Brandon Charles Cole challenged the trial court's denial of his motions to recuse via a petition for writ of mandamus. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition, focusing on two primary issues: procedural non-compliance and the availability of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court found that Cole failed to provide a sworn or certified record as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7. Substantively, the court held that under Texas Supreme Court precedent, the erroneous denial of a recusal motion does not satisfy the requirements for mandamus relief because the issue can be fully addressed through a direct appeal following a final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas civil and family law litigation, mandamus is generally unavailable to challenge a trial court's refusal to recuse. Practitioners must focus on meticulously perfecting the appellate record and preserving the bias issue for a post-judgment appeal rather than seeking mid-stream intervention."
Simon Rico, Jr. v. State
COA06
In Simon Rico, Jr. v. State, an appellant who was initially declared indigent and provided with court-appointed counsel substituted his representation for a private, retained attorney. When the retained attorney determined the appeal was frivolous, he attempted to follow the Anders v. California protocol by filing an Anders brief. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed whether these constitutional safeguards apply to non-indigent parties, concluding that the purpose of Anders is to provide indigent appellants with advocacy equal to those who can afford counsel. The court held that the substitution of retained counsel rebuts the presumption of continued indigency, meaning the attorney is not required to file an Anders brief and must instead follow the standard withdrawal procedures under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.5.
Litigation Takeaway
"In parental termination appeals, the rigorous Anders briefing requirement disappears the moment a party retains private counsel; hiring an attorney rebuts the presumption of indigency and shifts the procedural burden for withdrawing from a meritless appeal to the standard requirements of TRAP 6.5."
Nemarugommula v. VHS San Antonio Partners, LLC
COA04
Dr. Vishal Nemarugommula sought a temporary injunction to prevent Baptist Medical Center from reporting his disciplinary suspension to the Texas Medical Board and the National Practitioner Data Bank, claiming the peer-review process was a 'sham' and reporting would cause irreparable reputational and financial harm. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed the requirements for injunctive relief, specifically whether the physician demonstrated a probable right to recovery and irreparable injury. The court held that because an independent fair-hearing panel substantiated the underlying misconduct (unauthorized medical record access), the physician failed to show a probable right to relief, and the hospital's mandatory reporting duties outweighed the physician's claim of reputational damage.
Litigation Takeaway
"In litigation involving high-asset professionals, 'reputational harm' is rarely sufficient to enjoin mandatory reporting of disciplinary actions to licensing boards; courts will prioritize statutory transparency over a litigant's attempt to 'sanitize' their record during a divorce or custody battle."