Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
847 opinions found
City of Kingsville, et al. v. Tijerina
COA13
In a dispute over the timeliness of recall petitions, a petitioner filed her documents 31 days after the initiating affidavit, exceeding the 30-day mandatory window established by the City of Kingsville Charter. Although a city official provided the petitioner with a form stating the deadline began at a later date, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the Charter’s plain language controlled and required strict compliance. The court analyzed the Charter as organic law, concluding that official misinformation cannot override mandatory filing deadlines or create a ministerial duty where the petitioner failed to satisfy the law. The court reversed the trial court's grant of mandamus, holding it was an abuse of discretion to excuse a late filing based on equitable considerations.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on a clerk or court coordinator’s calculation of a deadline; official misinformation or misleading forms provided by court staff do not excuse a failure to strictly comply with mandatory statutory or jurisdictional timelines."
JLV Asset Management, Inc. v. The Chicken Place, Inc.
COA07
In a dispute over a promissory note, the parties disagreed on whether a payment made on the one-year anniversary of the contract's effective date satisfied a requirement to pay 'within one year.' The court applied the 'anniversary rule,' which dictates that unless a contract specifies a different count (like 365 days), 'one year' includes the calendar anniversary of the start date. Although the trial court erred by allowing a jury to interpret the unambiguous contract, the appellate court held the error was harmless because the jury’s conclusion aligned with the correct legal construction. The court ultimately held that the anniversary-date payment was timely as a matter of law.
Litigation Takeaway
"Under the Texas 'anniversary rule,' an obligation to perform 'within one year' includes the calendar anniversary of the effective date. To avoid deadline disputes in Mediated Settlement Agreements or Divorce Decrees, practitioners should define 'year' specifically or, preferably, use certain dates and times for performance rather than relative windows."
Castillo v. Martinez
COA08
In Castillo v. Martinez, the Appellants attempted to appeal a trial court's dismissal order several months after the deadline, arguing that the underlying judgment was 'void' and that a subsequent order denying their motion to vacate restarted the appellate clock. The El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, which dictates strict timelines for filing a notice of appeal. The court held that even if a judgment is legally defective or void, it still becomes final for purposes of appeal and triggers the mandatory 30- or 90-day filing window. Because the Appellants failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the original judgment, the court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, ruling that a party cannot circumvent appellate deadlines by simply labeling a judgment void.
Litigation Takeaway
"A judgment's alleged 'voidness' does not stop the appellate clock; practitioners must file their notice of appeal within the standard 30- or 90-day window following the final decree, as a later order denying a motion to vacate will not restart the timetable for a direct appeal."
Hill v. State
COA10
In Hill v. State, a defendant appealed the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge, alleging bias based on the judge's involvement in plea negotiations, the removal of the defendant’s spouse from the courtroom for a policy violation in an unrelated matter, and an ex parte text message to the prosecutor asking for a status update. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed these incidents under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b, determining that the judge's responses to settlement inquiries were invited by counsel and that the courtroom enforcement was routine administration rather than personal animus. The court held that the denial of the recusal motion was not an abuse of discretion because the evidence did not establish that the judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned or that he possessed a disqualifying personal bias.
Litigation Takeaway
"To successfully recuse a judge, you must build a record showing specific, targeted bias against a party rather than mere courtroom administration or a judge's refusal to accept certain settlement terms. Routine enforcement of courtroom decorum and non-substantive 'status-update' communications are generally insufficient to prove that a judge's impartiality is reasonably in question."
Romano v. Arrowhead Hill Farm, Inc.
COA09
In Romano v. Arrowhead Hill Farm, Inc., the Appellants challenged a no-evidence summary judgment, arguing the motion was legally insufficient because it failed to separately list the specific elements of three distinct DTPA sub-claims. The Beaumont Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i) in conjunction with the DTPA's statutory requirements. The court found that because 'producing cause' is an essential element common to all claims under Texas Business & Commerce Code § 17.50(a), specifically challenging that single element was sufficient to put the Appellants on notice. The court held that a no-evidence motion is sufficiently specific if it identifies a single element common to multiple theories of recovery, and affirmed the judgment because the Appellants failed to provide evidence in response.
Litigation Takeaway
"Defeat "kitchen sink" pleadings efficiently by using a precision-strike no-evidence motion for summary judgment that targets a single essential element—such as damages or causation—common to multiple overlapping claims."
In the Interest of I.H. and K.H., Children
COA13
In this Texas appellate case, an appellant (J.W.) filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their appeal and requested that the court tax costs against the party who incurred them. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(d), which establishes that, absent an agreement between the parties, the court must tax costs against the appellant. Because J.W. did not provide evidence of an agreement with the appellee regarding costs, the court denied the request to deviate from the default rule. However, because J.W. had filed a valid Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs under Rule 20.1, the court held that no costs would actually be assessed. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was shielded from costs due to their indigent status.
Litigation Takeaway
"When seeking a voluntary dismissal of an appeal, an appellant cannot unilaterally decide how court costs are distributed; without a formal agreement from the other party, the appellant is responsible for costs by default. However, maintaining a current Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs is a critical protection for indigent clients, as it overrides the default taxation rule and prevents the assessment of appellate fees."
In the Interest of B.C., a Child
COA02
A Mother sought to modify a residency restriction to move her child, who has severe autism and is nonverbal, from Texas to Florida to access specialized therapeutic and educational resources. The Father opposed the move and sought to further restrict the residency area. The trial court expanded the residency restriction to the continental United States, ordering the Mother to reimburse certain travel costs for the Father. The appellate court analyzed the case under the Lenz v. Lenz factors, noting that the child's specific medical needs, the Father's own relocation outside the restricted area, and his history of inconsistent visitation supported the move. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as the expansion was in the child's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In relocation cases involving special needs children, Texas courts may prioritize "resource disparity" over geographical proximity; practitioners should be aware that a non-custodial parent's own relocation can significantly weaken their ability to enforce or maintain local residency restrictions."
McCarver v. McCarver
COA12
After a husband failed to pay a $90,000 "financial security" judgment required by a divorce decree and premarital agreement, the wife sought a post-judgment turnover order and the appointment of a receiver. The husband attempted to block the order by asserting affirmative defenses such as waiver and release, arguing the premarital agreement's separate property protections shielded his assets. The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order, analyzing the doctrine of res judicata. The court held that because the premarital agreement's terms were already litigated (or could have been) during the divorce, the husband was barred from raising those contractual defenses to challenge an enforcement proceeding. Additionally, the court clarified that a turnover order is a final, appealable judgment, allowing for standard appellate timeline extensions.
Litigation Takeaway
"You only get "one bite at the apple" regarding premarital agreement defenses. If a party intends to use a prenuptial agreement to protect assets or waive liabilities, those arguments must be fully exhausted before the divorce decree becomes final; once a turnover proceeding begins, the court will only consider statutory exemptions, not contract-based defenses that were already adjudicated."
Cisneros v. Leal
COA04
After a minor passenger suffered catastrophic injuries in a car crash caused by a minor driver who had been drinking at several adults' homes, the victim sued the homeowners under Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code § 2.02(c). The trial court granted summary judgment for the homeowners, but the Fourth Court of Appeals reversed. The court analyzed the plain text of the 2005 statutory amendment, concluding that the Texas Legislature specifically created a civil cause of action against non-parent adults (21+) who knowingly provide alcohol to, or allow alcohol to be provided to, minors under 18 on premises they own or lease.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas law provides a clear statutory path to hold non-parent adults liable for hosting underage drinking; family law practitioners can use this 'social host' liability to argue for restricted possession or supervision requirements when a parent’s household or social circle endangers a child through permissive alcohol use."
In the Interest of J.M., a Child
COA12
After the Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate a mother's parental rights due to substance abuse and family violence, the parties executed a statutory Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) appointing the mother as a possessory conservator. Despite the agreement, the mother appealed the final order. The Twelfth Court of Appeals performed an independent review of the record and found the appeal frivolous under Anders v. California. The court held that because the MSA complied with Texas Family Code § 153.0071—including the required non-revocation language and voluntary signatures—it was binding on the trial court. While the court affirmed the judgment, it denied appointed counsel's motion to withdraw, clarifying that the right to counsel in government-initiated suits persists through the exhaustion of proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court.
Litigation Takeaway
"A statutory Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) is nearly unassailable on appeal if it contains the proper non-revocation language and is signed by all parties; furthermore, appointed counsel in CPS cases must remain on the case through the Texas Supreme Court level even if they believe the appeal is frivolous."