Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
863 opinions found
Armstrong v. Thomas
COA03
In Armstrong v. Thomas, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a same-day handwritten post-divorce side agreement allegedly giving one ex-spouse the right to buy the other’s house could not be enforced against the parties’ divorce paperwork. The agreement incident to divorce and final decree confirmed the property as the husband’s property, included present-tense conveyancing and quitclaim language, and the AID contained a merger clause stating it was the parties’ entire agreement. The court analyzed the dispute primarily through quiet-title and statute-of-frauds principles, concluding that the handwritten note lacked the essential terms required for an enforceable real-estate sale and that oral testimony and later conduct could not supply those missing terms. The court also held that findings of fact and conclusions of law are improper after summary judgment and that the wife’s nonsuit did not eliminate the husband’s pending counterclaims for affirmative relief. The summary judgment declaring the side agreement unenforceable and quieting title in the husband was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce-related real estate deal matters, put every material term in the decree package or referenced closing documents. A vague side agreement, even one signed the same day as the divorce papers, may be wiped out by merger language, quitclaim language, and the statute of frauds. For litigators, Armstrong is a strong early-summary-judgment case for attacking post-divorce property claims based on informal side deals."
In the Interest of M.T., a Child
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no non-frivolous issues to raise. The court reviewed whether Anders procedures apply in termination cases, whether counsel’s brief provided the required professional evaluation of the record, and whether the court’s own independent review revealed any arguable appellate issue. After confirming counsel addressed potential jurisdictional and evidentiary-sufficiency issues, including predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2), and after finding the mother’s pro se response identified no legal error, the court held the appeal was frivolous, affirmed the termination order, and dismissed the mother’s emergency motion for temporary relief as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family appeals, especially termination cases, appellate success depends on a preserved and legally developed trial record. If no concrete, non-frivolous issue was preserved below, appointed counsel may proceed under Anders, and a general plea for reversal will not substitute for an actual legal complaint."
Adejokun v. Obosi
COA14
In this divorce SAPCR, the mother sought to block the father’s access based on the child’s alleged abuse outcry and also asked the court to interview the 10-year-old child in chambers. The court of appeals held that the mother did not preserve any complaint about exclusion of the child’s hearsay statements because, when hearsay objections were made, she never invoked Texas Family Code section 104.006 or requested the statute’s required reliability hearing. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request to interview the child regarding possession and access, so the final judgment appointing the mother sole managing conservator and the father possessory conservator with supervised visitation was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to admit a child’s abuse outcry under Family Code section 104.006, you must expressly say so at trial, request the reliability hearing, and make a clear record. Serious allegations alone will not preserve error, and a motion for new trial cannot fix the omission later. Likewise, a request for an in-chambers child interview is not automatic and should be tied carefully to the governing statute and the specific issue before the court."
In the Interest of J.M.V.V., a Child
COA10
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no non-frivolous grounds for appeal after the trial court terminated the father’s rights under Family Code section 161.001 and appointed DFPS as managing conservator. The Waco Court of Appeals reviewed whether counsel’s Anders filing was adequate, confirmed counsel had summarized the facts, procedural history, and governing law, and then independently examined the full record, the father’s pro se response, and the State’s response. Finding no arguable basis for reversal, the court affirmed the termination order. The court also denied counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature, holding that appointed counsel remains obligated through potential Texas Supreme Court proceedings unless formally relieved.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas termination appeals, an Anders brief is not a shortcut out of the case: counsel must fully review the record, explain why no arguable issue exists, and continue representing the client through the petition-for-review stage unless relieved. For trial lawyers, the case is another reminder that appellate outcomes usually turn on preservation and a well-developed record."
In re Rebel Hayz Breaux
COA09
After completing his sentence for misdemeanor assault family violence, Breaux filed an article 11.09 habeas application alleging ongoing restraints from the conviction, including the lifetime federal firearm ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and a final protective order. The trial court denied relief solely because his sentence had expired and it concluded he was no longer restrained. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the pleaded federal firearm disability is a sufficient present restraint to support article 11.09 habeas jurisdiction, so the trial court erred in denying the application on that categorical ground. But the court also held that this did not automatically require issuance of the writ, an evidentiary hearing, merits rulings, or appointment of counsel, because the applicant still had to satisfy article 11.14’s procedural and verification requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
"A family-violence conviction does not become legally irrelevant once the sentence ends: the federal firearm ban can be enough continuing restraint to keep post-conviction habeas relief alive. For family-law litigators, that means old assault-family-violence convictions can still carry real leverage in custody, safety, and firearm-related disputes—but any collateral attack on the conviction must be pleaded and verified with precision."
In re Claudia Jacobs
COA05
In this post-divorce enforcement dispute, the relator sought mandamus relief and an emergency stay to block an order to appear and an upcoming enforcement hearing. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the mandamus filing was procedurally defective: the petition lacked the certification required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52, the record did not contain sworn or certified copies of material documents, and the appendix included unredacted sensitive information in violation of Rule 9.9. The court held that these threshold defects defeated mandamus relief, denied the stay as moot, and struck the petition and appendix for the redaction violation.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law mandamus practice, procedure is substance. If your petition lacks a Rule 52 certification, your record is not sworn or certified, or your filing contains unredacted sensitive data, the court may deny relief without ever reaching the underlying enforcement issue."
Hutton v. Alfrido
COA14
In Hutton v. Alfrido, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from a final protective order for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was filed too late. Although the appellant filed a timely post-judgment motion that functioned like a motion for new trial and extended the deadline to 90 days after the order was signed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a), the notice of appeal still had to be filed by February 3, 2026, or within the additional 15-day Verburgt grace period by February 18, 2026. Filing on February 27 was outside both deadlines. The court also rejected the appellant’s apparent attempt to rely on a later denial of a motion to set aside or reconsider the protective order, explaining that such a denial is not independently appealable and does not create a new appellate deadline. And because the record showed only a docket-sheet notation—not a signed order—there was no appealable later order in any event. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, calendar appellate deadlines from the original final order, not from a later ruling on a motion to reconsider or set aside. A post-judgment motion may extend the deadline, but it does not restart it indefinitely, and docket-sheet entries are not appealable orders. If there is any doubt, get a signed order, calculate the Rule 26.1 and Verburgt deadlines immediately, and file the notice of appeal early."
In the Interest of I.P.P., a Child
COA05
In *In the Interest of I.P.P., a Child*, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed an order declaring a pro se mother a vexatious litigant in an ongoing SAPCR. After years of repeated filings—including modification, enforcement, TRO, reconsideration, and emergency requests—the father moved under Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to restrict her future pro se filings. The mother argued Chapter 11 should not apply within a single SAPCR, that her filings did not qualify as repeated relitigation, and that refusing to hear her emergency conservatorship-modification request violated due process and parental-rights protections. The court reviewed the ruling for abuse of discretion and held the order was independently supported by § 11.054(2), which permits vexatious-litigant findings based on repeated relitigation or attempted relitigation after adverse determinations. The court rejected any categorical exemption for SAPCR or “emergency” filings and found no reversible constitutional error on the briefing and record presented.
Litigation Takeaway
"Chapter 11 is available in family cases, including SAPCRs, to curb serial pro se filings that recycle issues already decided. If you want vexatious-litigant relief, build a chronology tying each new filing to prior final rulings and show why the new pleading has no reasonable chance of success. If you are filing a modification or emergency motion, make sure it rests on genuinely new facts—not just a new label for old complaints."
Newrez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing v. Kinney L. Barcuch
COA05
In a restricted appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a default judgment against Newrez LLC because the record showed the plaintiff failed to strictly comply with Texas service rules. The plaintiff served an unrelated individual and then an incorrect South Carolina entity rather than Newrez’s actual registered agent or another statutorily authorized person. The court rejected the appellee’s argument that the restricted appeal failed due to a supposedly incomplete clerk’s record, concluding the existing record sufficiently established nonparticipation and no timely post-judgment filings. Because defective service was apparent on the face of the record, the trial court never acquired personal jurisdiction, so the default judgment was void and had to be reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Default judgments are only as strong as the service record. In Texas, especially in default settings, courts require strict compliance with service rules, and serving the wrong agent, wrong entity, or wrong address can make the judgment void months later on restricted appeal. For family lawyers, this is a major warning in default divorces, modifications, enforcements, and cases involving LLCs or third-party entities tied to the marital estate: verify the exact legal identity and registered agent before prove-up, or risk losing the judgment entirely."
Griffith v. Barrett
COA14
In Griffith v. Barrett, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a temporary injunction was void because the order did not set the case for trial on the merits as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. The injunction stated only that it would remain in effect until final judgment or further order, which the court found was not a substitute for an affirmative merits trial setting. Applying the strict-compliance rule from InterFirst Bank and Qwest, the court treated the omission as a facial defect that rendered the injunction void, reversed the order, dissolved the injunction, and remanded without reaching other issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want temporary injunctive relief in a family-law-adjacent case, draft the order like a real Rule 683 injunction. An order that says it lasts until final judgment is not enough; the injunction itself must set the case for trial on the merits. For the responding party, this is a strong procedural attack point that can dissolve an overbroad injunction before litigating the underlying facts."