Opinion Library

In the Interest of A.W., N.W., N.W., P.W., Children

COA13

After a jury terminated Mother’s parental rights to four children, she appealed claiming the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support constructive abandonment and best interest, and also complained the order lacked required statutory findings. The court did not reach the merits because Texas preservation rules apply in termination jury trials just as in other civil jury cases. Mother filed none of the recognized preservation vehicles for legal sufficiency and no motion for new trial, which is required to preserve factual-sufficiency complaints. The court also noted that Mother challenged only subsection (N) while the jury also found unchallenged predicate grounds under subsections (D), (E), and (O), any one of which could support termination with a best-interest finding. The court held all complained-of issues were waived or would not afford relief and affirmed the termination order.

Litigation Takeaway

"In any jury-tried family case, appellate sufficiency complaints must be preserved in the trial court or they are likely gone forever. If you may challenge a jury finding on appeal, use a recognized preservation motion, and for factual sufficiency always file a motion for new trial. In termination cases especially, challenge every predicate ground necessary for meaningful relief and promptly object to missing statutory findings in the final order."

Appeal and Mandamus

In the Matter of the Marriage of Sini Ann Mathews and Wesley Mon Mathews

COA13

In this divorce case, the appellant tried to use a restricted appeal to challenge the final divorce decree after already filing a timely motion for new trial. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a restricted appeal is available only if the appellant did not timely file any post-judgment motion, and that requirement is jurisdictional under the appellate rules and Ex parte E.H. Because the motion for new trial was filed within thirty days of the decree, the appellant could not satisfy a required element of restricted appeal. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction and held that later efforts to obtain the appellate record could not cure the defect.

Litigation Takeaway

"Choose your post-judgment remedy carefully. In Texas family cases, a timely motion for new trial and a restricted appeal are not interchangeable fallback options—filing the motion for new trial destroys restricted-appeal jurisdiction."

General trial issues

Juan Morales a/k/a Juan Manuel Morales v. The State of Texas

COA13

In Juan Morales a/k/a Juan Manuel Morales v. The State of Texas, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the defendant’s fourth and fifth motions for continuance in a retrial for continuous sexual abuse of a child. The defense argued it needed more time because its proposed expert was unavailable, first citing medical issues and later scheduling conflicts. The court applied Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 29.03, 29.06, 29.07, and 29.08 and held that the trial court acted within its discretion because the continuance motions did not meet the strict statutory requirements for an absent-witness continuance. The fourth motion lacked required specifics about diligence, the expected testimony, and other mandatory elements, and the fifth motion was unverified, which preserved nothing for appellate review. The court also noted the case had already been continued multiple times and the record did not show the expert was medically unavailable on the actual trial date. The conviction was therefore affirmed on the continuance issue.

Litigation Takeaway

"If you want a continuance because an expert cannot appear, do not rely on general fairness arguments. File a sworn motion, show specific diligence, explain exactly why the expert matters, prove the absence was not self-created, and give the court a concrete timeline for availability. In family cases, Morales is a strong tool for defeating vague last-minute reset requests and a warning that repeated continuances seriously weaken any appellate complaint."

Modifying the Parenting Plan

Loria v. Loria

COA03

In Loria v. Loria, the Third Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s order modifying conservatorship rights after a bench trial. The father sought to change the prior joint-managing-conservatorship structure by obtaining the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence and greater medical and tie-breaking authority, arguing that circumstances had materially and substantially changed and that the existing arrangement had become unworkable. The appellate court, applying the abuse-of-discretion standard and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations, held that evidence of persistent coparenting conflict, interference with communication, disputes over vaccinations and therapy, lack of follow-through on the children’s developmental needs, and the father’s more stable household was sufficient to support findings of material and substantial change and best interest. The court therefore upheld the reallocation of primary-residence and decision-making rights.

Litigation Takeaway

"Modification cases are rarely won by one dramatic fact; they are won by proving a pattern of specific, child-centered problems showing the current order no longer works. If you want to modify conservatorship, build a record with concrete evidence of communication breakdowns, medical and educational conflict, parenting instability, and why a clearer allocation of rights will better serve the child."

In the Interest of L.D.M.W.

COA09

The Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights to his child after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient on multiple predicate grounds and on best interest. The court emphasized Father’s prior termination order containing endangerment findings, his decision to continue a relationship with Mother despite prior CPS history and similar risks, his incarceration before the child’s birth and throughout the case, and his resulting inability to care for the child or meaningfully complete services. The court also held that an approved relative home study did not outweigh evidence of parental unfitness and the child’s successful, stable foster placement with a family ready to adopt.

Litigation Takeaway

"Past endangerment findings, repeated exposure of a child to known risky relationships, and incarceration-related inability to parent can strongly support termination—especially when the child is thriving in a stable adoptive placement. An approved relative placement is helpful but does not, by itself, defeat termination or overcome a strong best-interest record."

In the Interest of H.P. Jr. and H.P. III, Children

COA14

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (b)(2). The court viewed the evidence cumulatively, not incident by incident, and held that the parents’ repeated domestic violence, incarceration, criminal conduct, instability, missed medical care for the children, substance-abuse and mental-health concerns, failure to complete services, and inability to provide safe care showed a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children. The same evidence, along with the children’s improvement in foster care, supported the best-interest finding.

Litigation Takeaway

"Texas courts can infer endangerment and best interest from a parent’s overall pattern of violence, criminality, instability, untreated substance-abuse or mental-health issues, missed medical care, and service-plan noncompliance. In family cases, a party who wants to prove or defeat risk-based restrictions should build or attack the full course-of-conduct narrative, not just isolated events."

In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child

COA13

In *In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child*, the mother challenged only one part of the termination judgment: whether the trial court used the correct version of Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O). The suit was filed in 2023, but the Legislature amended § 161.001 effective September 1, 2025, repealing the old service-plan ground in subsection (O) and renumbering the substance-abuse ground into subsection (O). The Thirteenth Court focused on the amendment’s express transition clause, which made the new law apply to SAPCRs pending in the trial court on the effective date. Because this case was still pending on September 1, 2025 and was tried afterward, the amended statute controlled. The court held the trial court correctly applied amended subsection (O) and affirmed the termination order.

Litigation Takeaway

"When a family case stays pending across a legislative change, do not assume the filing date controls. Always check the session law’s effective-date and transition provisions, because amended Family Code sections can apply to pending SAPCRs and change pleadings, proof, jury charge, judgment language, and appellate strategy."

In the Interest of K.M.N., P.N. III, E.J.N., I.A.N., B.L.N., C.A.N., S.V.N., L.F.N., and S.N., Children

COA01

The First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. The court relied on extensive evidence of danger and instability, including Mother’s cocaine use at the birth of the youngest child, unsafe and unsanitary housing, educational neglect, parentification of older siblings, Father’s sexual-abuse conviction and history of physical abuse, and Mother’s prolonged failure to protect the children despite knowing of Father’s violence and alleged killing of one child. Applying the Family Code best-interest framework and Holley factors, the court held the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief that termination was in the children’s best interest, and it separately affirmed Father’s termination after independent Anders review revealed no non-frivolous appellate issue.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas family-law cases, failure to protect can be just as powerful as direct abuse. A parent who continues to align with a known abuser, minimizes danger, or cannot show a real safety plan risks losing conservatorship or parental rights even if that parent was not the primary perpetrator."

Appeal and Mandamus

Bouvier v. Thompson

COA02

In Bouvier v. Thompson, the plaintiff sued family members in 2024 claiming they concealed inheritance information, committed fraud, breached fiduciary duties, and conspired to deprive her of assets she said she should have inherited. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment because the defendant used the plaintiff’s own prior filings to show she knew the key facts no later than 2014: she believed Ezelle was her biological mother, believed an inheritance was owed to her, and believed family members were concealing it. Applying Texas’s four-year limitations periods for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and the derivative limitations rule for conspiracy, the court held the claims accrued by 2014 and were therefore time-barred when filed in 2024. The court also emphasized that arguments about delayed discovery or concealment do not defeat summary judgment without competent evidence.

Litigation Takeaway

"Labels do not save stale claims. If a client’s earlier pleadings, letters, or filings show they already knew the essential facts, Texas limitations likely starts running then—even if they later say they lacked full proof. In family-related property, probate-overlap, and fraud cases, lawyers should audit prior statements carefully, plead only recognized causes of action, and support any tolling theory with actual summary-judgment evidence."

Appeal and Mandamus

Spragins v. Lunn 34 Cattle

COA02

In Spragins v. Lunn 34 Cattle, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals looked past the trial court’s label of a “restraining order” and held that the order was actually a temporary injunction because it was entered after a contested evidentiary hearing and remained in effect “until further order” during the pendency of the case. Applying Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 683 and 684, the court held the order was void because it did not affirmatively set the case for trial on the merits and did not fix a bond. The court rejected the idea that an “until further order” clause could satisfy Rule 683 and dissolved the injunction.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases, the label on an order does not control—its function does. If an order entered after notice and hearing operates like a temporary injunction, it must strictly comply with Rules 683 and 684 by including a merits trial setting and a bond amount. Otherwise, the order may be void and vulnerable to immediate interlocutory attack."