Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
863 opinions found
Cedillo v. State
COA01
In Cedillo v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that a party does not preserve an Article 38.072 reliability complaint by arguing only about who qualifies as the proper outcry witness. Cedillo challenged witness identity at the outcry hearing, but on appeal reframed the issue as whether the children’s statements to the mother, grandmother, and counselor were unreliable. The court applied Texas preservation rules and concluded that a generic or differently framed objection did not alert the trial court to a specific reliability challenge based on the statutory factors of time, content, and circumstances. The court also held that any assumed error was harmless because the complainants and CAC records provided substantially similar evidence without objection. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want appellate review of a child-disclosure reliability issue, say so specifically and build the record around reliability—not just hearsay, process, or who the proper witness is. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, separate each evidentiary objection, get a clear ruling, and object consistently to repeated similar evidence or harmless-error will likely defeat any appeal."
In Re Kathryn Copeland
COA05
In In re Copeland, a pro se litigant already subject to a vexatious-litigant prefiling order sought mandamus after the local administrative judge denied her request under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 11.102(d). The Dallas Court of Appeals held that section 11.102(d) is only a gatekeeping mechanism for deciding whether a vexatious litigant may file new litigation; it does not authorize the local administrative judge to declare the underlying vexatious-litigant order void ab initio. Because Copeland’s motion primarily sought a collateral attack on the prior order rather than permission to file identified new litigation, and because she failed to show the judge had authority to grant the requested relief, mandamus was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not use a Chapter 11 permission request as a backdoor attack on an existing vexatious-litigant order. In family-law cases, be precise about whether you are seeking permission to file new litigation, filing in an existing case, or challenging the validity of the prior prefiling order—because those are different procedural paths, and mixing them can sink the request and any mandamus challenge."
Dillon Austin Venson v. The State of Texas
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly designated a forensic interviewer as the Article 38.072 outcry witness even though the child first told her mother that the defendant had 'messed with' her and put his hands down her pants. The court explained that the outcry witness is not automatically the first adult who hears any allegation of abuse, but the first adult who receives a statement that describes the alleged offense in a discernible way. Because the mother described the initial conversation as brief and lacking detail, while the later CAC interview provided specific facts about the sexual touching, the trial court acted within its discretion in selecting the forensic interviewer. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to support the indecency-with-a-child conviction and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-abuse-related family litigation, do not assume the first adult listener controls the evidentiary story. Courts will focus on the first sufficiently descriptive disclosure, not merely the first mention of abuse. For practitioners, the key is to build a precise disclosure timeline, compare the exact content of each statement, and frame arguments around specificity rather than chronology."
In the Interest of B.W., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of B.W., the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a child could not appeal an order terminating his father’s parental rights when the child, through counsel, had only filed a general denial and opposed termination at trial but had not pleaded any affirmative claim for relief or identified any Family Code provision authorizing the appeal. The court analyzed the issue as a threshold question of appellate standing and subject-matter jurisdiction, explaining that participation in the trial court does not itself make someone an aggrieved party for appellate purposes. Because B.W. showed no legally recognized justiciable interest that was injuriously affected by the judgment, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the sufficiency challenge to the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume that trial participation preserves appellate rights in a family case. To appeal, the would-be appellant must have a statutory basis to do so and must be an aggrieved party whose own legally recognized interest was harmed by the judgment; a general denial and opposition at trial are not enough."
Fulton v. State
COA07
In Fulton v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a trial court could not assess $787.50 in court-appointed attorney’s fees against a defendant who had repeatedly been found indigent when the record contained no evidence of a material change in her financial circumstances or any present ability to pay. The court relied on article 26.05(g) and Mayer v. State, emphasizing that boilerplate recitals and an administrative order entered without a hearing do not substitute for evidence. The court also struck a $500 fine that was never orally pronounced, deleted a $443 reparation award unsupported by the record, and removed a premature $15 time-payment fee. The judgment, bill of costs, and withdrawal order were modified accordingly.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a court is going to impose attorney’s fees or other monetary obligations on a party previously found indigent, the record must affirmatively show present ability to pay and any material change in circumstances. For family-law litigants, Fulton is a strong analogy for attacking unsupported fee awards, reimbursement orders, and cost assessments that rest on assumptions rather than evidence."
In Re Jose Gilberto Perez
COA05
In this original proceeding, a father sought mandamus relief after the trial court denied his request to modify SAPCR temporary orders that apparently left the child with a nonparent. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of his parental-presumption arguments because his mandamus record was fatally incomplete: he omitted the operative January 2025 temporary order, the relevant motions, and properly authenticated transcripts and exhibits from the hearings that led to the ruling. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7 and standard mandamus principles, the court held he failed to show a clear abuse of discretion. The court also struck the petition and record for including unredacted sensitive data, and denied relief without prejudice to refiling with a compliant record.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus rises or falls on the record. Even strong family-law arguments about parental rights or improper nonparent conservatorship will go nowhere if the petition does not include the actual order being challenged, the key motions, and authenticated transcripts and exhibits from every material hearing. Also, do a final Rule 9.9 redaction check before filing."
In the Interest of A.P.Z., a Child
COA05
In In re A.P.Z., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a custody-modification order after Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to give Father the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence. The court did not reach the merits of Mother’s evidentiary complaints because the appellate record was incomplete: it omitted the trial court’s in-camera interview of the 15-year-old child, a referenced child interview status report, and related proceedings. Applying settled Texas appellate rules, the court presumed the missing portions of the reporter’s record supported the judgment. Because Mother’s arguments depended on the state of the evidence, the court held those complaints were waived and treated the evidence as sufficient to support implied findings of material and substantial change and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you plan to challenge a custody or modification ruling on evidentiary grounds, you must bring up a complete appellate record—especially any in-camera child interview under Family Code § 153.009. In family cases, missing hearings, report-back settings, or child interviews will usually trigger a presumption that the omitted evidence supports the judgment, making sufficiency and abuse-of-discretion complaints effectively dead on arrival."
In the Interest of Z.D., a Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. The court first analyzed whether counsel complied with Anders, In re Schulman, and Kelly by thoroughly reviewing the record, serving the mother with the brief and motion to withdraw, and advising her of her right to review the record and file a pro se response. After conducting its own independent review, the court found no arguable ground for reversal, including no viable challenge to the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), where the record showed a pattern of drug abuse creating substantial risk of harm to the child and impairing the mother’s ability to parent. The court also held that counsel’s motion to withdraw was premature because appointed counsel in termination appeals generally must continue representation through exhaustion of further appellate remedies under Family Code section 107.016(2) and In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination cases, Anders review will not save a weak record challenge where the evidence clearly ties a parent’s substance abuse to danger, instability, and inability to safely parent. For trial lawyers, the lesson is to build a record that specifically connects conduct to child endangerment and best interest; for appointed appellate counsel, the lesson is to strictly follow Anders procedures and expect representation to continue beyond the court of appeals unless properly relieved."
The Bryant Law Firm and Deborah E. Bryant v. Robert Walker
SCOTX
In a fee-dispute case with family-law implications, the Texas Supreme Court held that a client’s claims against his former lawyer were barred by accord and satisfaction under Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 3.311. After the client demanded a refund and complained that the lawyer’s alleged mishandling of his child-support-termination matter caused additional losses, the lawyer sent a $3,300 refund check and a release. The check conspicuously stated that cashing it would be a full and final settlement and release of all claims. The Court concluded the statutory elements were satisfied because the refund was tendered in good faith, there was a bona fide dispute over the amount and scope of the client’s claims, and the client deposited the check with actual knowledge of the settlement condition. The client’s attempt to cross out the release language and refusal to sign a separate release did not matter because negotiating the check itself completed the accord and satisfaction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat any check marked as full settlement like a binding settlement offer, not routine payment. In family-law disputes over fees, reimbursements, equalization payments, or support-related expenses, depositing a conspicuously conditioned check can wipe out larger claims—even if you write "under protest," strike the language, or decline to sign a separate release."
Fair v. Powell
COA03
In Fair v. Powell, the Austin Court of Appeals rejected a claimed implied easement by necessity across neighboring property in a family land dispute. Fair argued her guesthouse and event-center tract needed access over the Powells’ driveway, but the court focused on Texas’s strict-necessity standard and the time-of-severance requirement. Relying on deed history, recorded instruments, and affidavit testimony showing Fair’s property already had access to Keeneland Drive by a road on her own land, the court held the tract was not landlocked. Because an easement by necessity cannot arise from convenience, lower cost, or longstanding permissive family use, and because alternate access existed, no implied easement by necessity was established.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your client claims a right to keep using a family roadway, driveway, or gate after divorce, partition, or sale, historical practice alone is not enough. Courts will demand objective proof—deeds, surveys, severance history, and actual access to a public road—and any alternate route, even if unpaved or less desirable, can defeat an implied-easement-by-necessity claim."