Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
863 opinions found
In the Interest of J.E.F. and J.J.F., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court held that, even on a thin record, legally and factually sufficient evidence showed the father knowingly exposed the children to endangering conditions and engaged in an endangering course of conduct. Key facts included an incident where the children were left alone and the father returned intoxicated, his resulting abandonment and child-endangerment conviction, domestic-violence concerns, a protective-order violation, and instability caused by incarceration. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the deferential sufficiency review required in termination cases, the court concluded those facts supported both the environmental endangerment finding under subsection (D) and the conduct-based endangerment finding under subsection (E), and affirmed under In re N.G.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment findings are often built from a pattern, not a single event. In both termination and private custody litigation, facts like unsafe supervision, intoxication, family violence, protective-order violations, criminal conduct, and incarceration can support major restrictions on parental rights. Lawyers should build a detailed record tying each fact to either the child’s environment, the parent’s course of conduct, or both—because appellate courts will closely review subsection (D) and (E) findings and those findings can have lasting consequences."
Manka v. Acosta
COA04
In Manka v. Acosta, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a civil-assault verdict arising from a courthouse encounter during a family-law case. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because there was no bodily injury and the video did not clearly show the precise grabbing alleged. The court rejected that framing, holding that offensive-contact assault under Texas Penal Code section 22.01(a)(3) does not require bodily injury. Applying ordinary legal- and factual-sufficiency review, the court relied on the plaintiff’s testimony, corroborating witness testimony, security video showing escalating physical contact and invasion of personal space, the plaintiff’s immediate reaction and outcry, and surrounding circumstances to conclude the jury could infer both that the contact occurred and that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known it would be regarded as offensive or provocative. The court therefore held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support liability.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law-adjacent settings, intrusive touching does not become legally trivial just because it leaves no injury or is only partially captured on video. Lawyers should treat courthouse, mediation, and exchange-site conduct as potential tort and family-case evidence: immediate outcry, witness observations, partial surveillance footage, and contextual proof can be enough to prove offensive-contact assault and to shape credibility, protective-order, conservatorship, and trial-strategy issues."
Brigham v. State
COA05
In Brigham v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defendant challenging an Article 38.072 outcry ruling must preserve the exact complaint made on appeal. The defense broadly objected to the forensic interviewer being designated as the outcry witness "in this case," but on appeal argued a narrower theory: that the interviewer may have been proper for some incidents, yet the child’s mother was the proper outcry witness for one specific alleged event. The court emphasized that outcry analysis is event-specific in multi-incident abuse cases, that the objecting party must distinctly identify the incident and the earlier qualifying disclosure, and that trial courts are not required to parse an undeveloped theory. Because the defense did not make that event-specific argument in the trial court, the complaint was not preserved under Rule 33.1(a), and the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your evidentiary objection is event-specific, your record must be event-specific too. In abuse-related family cases, broad objections to CAC, therapist, parent, or forensic-interviewer testimony will not preserve a narrower appellate complaint unless counsel clearly identifies the particular incident, the competing witness, and why that earlier disclosure legally qualifies."
Mack v. State
COA04
In Mack v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals rejected a legal-sufficiency challenge to child-sexual-assault convictions where the child did not visually observe the perpetrator during the assaults. The court applied Jackson v. Virginia and article 38.07, emphasizing that identity may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence and that a child complainant’s testimony alone can support conviction. Here, the child testified she recognized the defendant by his distinctive smell, cigarette odor, breath, bodily presence, and the surrounding household circumstances, and she later identified him in court. The court held that the cumulative force of that testimony, along with corroborating outcry context, was enough for a rational jury to find identity beyond a reasonable doubt despite the absence of physical evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child’s abuse allegation is not weak just because the child did not see the alleged abuser or there is no forensic proof. In family-law cases, courts may give significant weight to sensory-based identification, household context, and outcry testimony when assessing safety, credibility, and possession restrictions. If you are advancing the claim, build the full context carefully; if you are defending it, attack the reliability of the identification itself—not merely the lack of corroboration."
In the Matter of J.P., a Juvenile
COA05
In this juvenile appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed a written modification order that committed J.P. to TJJD but cited Family Code section 54.04(f), the original-disposition statute, instead of section 54.05(f), the statute governing modification proceedings. After conducting its Anders review, the court concluded the record clearly showed this was a modification case, that J.P. had pleaded true to the probation violation, and that the underlying felony adjudication made him eligible for TJJD commitment. Because the defect was a drafting error rather than a lack of authority or harmful substantive error, the court reformed the order to substitute section 54.05(f) for section 54.04(f) and affirmed the order as modified. The court also denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw because counsel’s duties continue through the petition-for-review stage absent good cause.
Litigation Takeaway
"Not every mistake in a written order justifies reversal. If the record clearly shows what the trial court intended and supports the relief granted, an appellate court may reform a mis-cited or internally inconsistent order rather than remand or reverse. For family-law litigators, that means two things: draft orders carefully, and on appeal focus on whether the defect is truly substantive and harmful or merely a correctable scrivener’s error."
In the Interest of S.V.H.F., A Child
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights after a three-month-old infant suffered severe non-accidental head trauma while in the father’s exclusive care. The court relied on medical records showing intracranial bleeding and retinal hemorrhages consistent with abusive acceleration/deceleration injury, and held the trial court was entitled to reject the father’s innocent explanation that the child merely choked or asphyxiated on milk. Applying the clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), and because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough, it did not need to reach subsection (D).
Litigation Takeaway
"When a very young child suffers serious unexplained injuries during one parent’s exclusive care, Texas courts may infer endangerment from circumstantial medical evidence alone—even without pinpoint testimony about the exact timing or mechanism of injury. For family-law litigators, the case highlights the importance of building or attacking the exclusivity timeline, medical-record causation, and witness credibility, because a factfinder may simply disbelieve a parent’s benign account and that can be enough to sustain major protective relief."
In the Interest of S.M.M. and R.M.M., Minor Children
COA05
In a child-support modification case, the trial court signed a 2022 order awarding Mother $22,953.40 in attorney’s fees after taking fees under advisement at the hearing. After plenary power expired, the court later signed a nunc pro tunc judgment deleting that award and requiring each party to pay their own fees. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that because the court had not orally rendered a fee ruling at the hearing, the signed 2022 order was itself the rendition of judgment on fees. Deleting the fee award and replacing it with a take-nothing fees provision was a substantive change to the judgment actually rendered, not a clerical correction permitted by Rule 316. The nunc pro tunc judgment was therefore void, and the original fee award remained in place.
Litigation Takeaway
"Once plenary power expires, a court can fix clerical mistakes in a family-law order, but it cannot use nunc pro tunc to rewrite who owes attorney’s fees or other substantive obligations. If a signed order is the first actual rendition on an issue, any challenge to that ruling must be made through timely post-judgment motions or appeal—not later by calling the change a mere clerical correction."
In the Interest of N. L. S. and E. J. C., Children
COA01
After Mother’s parental rights were terminated, she filed a petition to reinstate them under Texas Family Code section 161.302 while the children had not yet been adopted and were not yet subject to adoption placement agreements. Before the reinstatement hearing, however, DFPS executed adoption placement agreements for the children. The First Court of Appeals applied a strict plain-language reading of sections 161.302 and 161.303, holding that section 161.302 governs only filing eligibility, while section 161.303 governs the merits at the hearing. Because section 161.303 requires proof that the child is not subject to an adoption placement agreement at the time relief is granted, and the children were subject to such agreements at the hearing, Mother could not obtain reinstatement. The court also rejected the argument that filing a reinstatement petition creates an implied stay barring DFPS from moving forward with adoptive placement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Filing eligibility is not the same as winning on the merits. In reinstatement and other family-law cases involving timing-sensitive statutes, lawyers must confirm whether the controlling facts are measured at filing or at the hearing. A petition that is valid when filed can still fail if key facts change before the court rules, and courts will not read an implied stay into the Family Code without express statutory language."
In re Matthiew Adrian Alirol
COA13
After a trial court granted a new trial and set aside an agreed divorce decree, the relator sought mandamus relief, arguing the ruling was improper. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals focused on the procedural posture: this was a nonjury divorce matter, not a case involving a jury verdict. Applying Texas mandamus standards, the court explained that mandamus generally requires both a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal, and that immediate mandamus review of new-trial orders is far more limited in bench or agreed-decree cases than in jury-verdict cases. Because the relator did not show the new-trial order was void or that extraordinary circumstances made ordinary appellate review inadequate, the court denied mandamus and allowed the case to proceed in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a trial court grants a new trial after an agreed or bench-tried divorce decree, mandamus is usually not the answer. Unless you can show the order is void or that truly exceptional circumstances make appeal inadequate, the practical path is to preserve error, retry the case, and challenge the ruling in a regular appeal after final judgment."
Cedillo v. State
COA01
In Cedillo v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that a party does not preserve an appellate complaint that a child’s outcry statements were unreliable under Article 38.072 by arguing only about which adult was the proper outcry witness. The trial dispute focused on witness designation—whether the mother, grandmother, counselor, or another adult was the first qualifying recipient of the child’s disclosure—not on the separate statutory reliability inquiry requiring analysis of the statement’s time, content, and circumstances. Because Cedillo did not specifically raise that reliability objection in the trial court, the court found the complaint waived. The court also held that any error would have been harmless because substantially similar abuse evidence came in through the children’s own testimony and unobjected-to medical records.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, do not lump together distinct evidentiary objections. If you want to challenge a child’s statement as unreliable, say so clearly and tie the objection to the governing reliability standard; arguing only that the wrong adult is serving as the messenger will not preserve the issue for appeal. And if similar testimony or records come in elsewhere without objection, any evidentiary complaint may still fail on harmless-error grounds."