Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
863 opinions found
Dongmei Pan and Arconslp LLC v. Lihua Wang and Shufeng Zhang
COA14
In Pan v. Wang, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected efforts to turn promises made during an extramarital affair into actionable fraud or fiduciary-duty claims. The dispute involved both affair-related allegations and separate business, wage, and property issues, including financial transfers, a joint venture, unpaid salary, and ownership of real property. Relying on Texas public policy favoring preservation of marriage, the court held that Texas does not recognize claims based on promises to leave a spouse, marry a paramour, or continue an adulterous relationship, and that an affair alone does not create a fiduciary relationship or legally justifiable reliance. Applying that rule, the court upheld the trial court’s refusal of jury submissions and exclusion of duplicative evidence aimed at those non-cognizable theories, while affirming the judgment on the remaining ordinary commercial and property claims.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts will not award damages for broken promises made in the course of an affair. In family-law and related property litigation, lawyers should separate adultery facts that may matter for recognized issues—like property tracing, reimbursement, or fault—from barred tort or reliance theories based on promises to divorce, marry, or continue the relationship."
In the Interest of R.A., a Child
COA02
Father appealed after a Texas trial court dismissed a UCCJEA temporary emergency-jurisdiction case involving a child already subject to a Washington custody order. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals did not reach whether the Texas dismissal was correct when entered. Instead, it focused on mootness and the provisional nature of Texas Family Code § 152.204. After the appeal was filed, Washington—the state with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction—entered temporary custody orders addressing the child’s safety, care, therapy, and Father’s access. Because those later Washington orders superseded the emergency relief Father sought to preserve in Texas, the court held there was no longer any effective appellate relief available and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is only a short-term bridge, not a way to convert Texas into the permanent custody forum. In interstate custody disputes, if the decree state continues exercising jurisdiction and enters operative custody orders, any Texas appeal tied to emergency jurisdiction may become moot fast."
In the Interest of I.W.O., a Child
COA10
In this SAPCR modification appeal, Mother argued the trial court wrongly kept the parties’ child from testifying live before the jury about his schooling, medical care, visitation with Father, and desire not to live with Father. The Waco court held that a child’s testimony is not exempt from ordinary evidentiary rules and that Rule 403 can permit exclusion when the proposed testimony would be needlessly cumulative of evidence already admitted through therapists, counselors, providers, the custody evaluator, the parents, and an offer of proof. The court distinguished Callicott as a competency case, not a rule creating an automatic right to present a child witness. Even assuming exclusion was error, the court found no reversible harm because the child’s views were already in the record and Mother could not show the absence of live testimony probably caused an improper judgment. The judgment appointing Father sole managing conservator was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a child to testify in a custody-modification jury trial, do more than say the child’s preferences are important. Be prepared to show what the child will add that no other witness or record already covers. And if the testimony is excluded, a detailed offer of proof is essential—but it will not win reversal if the same substance is already elsewhere in the record."
Israel Villalobos v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Villalobos v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to sentencing without a presentence investigation report and without a separate punishment hearing after adjudication, and whether the written judgment accurately reflected the trial court’s oral true findings on the motion to adjudicate. The court held the ineffective-assistance claims failed because Villalobos had already waived a PSI and Texas law permits a unitary adjudication-and-punishment proceeding, so counsel’s conduct was not shown to be deficient on this record. But because the written judgment misstated which allegations were found true, and the State conceded the errors, the court reformed the judgment under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) to match the actual oral findings and affirmed the judgment as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a written judgment is accurate just because the court’s oral ruling was clear. If a judgment overstates or misstates the findings actually made, that error can distort later family-law litigation involving custody, protective orders, enforcement, or credibility. Verify the criminal record against the oral pronouncement and seek correction or appellate reformation before the judgment is used as shorthand proof in family court."
Rideout v. Rideout
COA02
In Rideout v. Rideout, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a Chapter 7B protective order after finding sufficient evidence that a former husband engaged in stalking of his ex-wife in the post-divorce co-parenting context. The evidence showed a continuing course of conduct: repeated unwanted appearances at her church, child activities, gym, restaurants, and stores; hostile and excessive AppClose messages; apparent monitoring of her vehicle and location; and disregard of prior communication limits and a 30-foot stay-away restriction. Applying Chapter 7B and Penal Code sections 42.072 and 42.07, the court treated the case as a pattern-based stalking record rather than isolated incidents, giving weight to both Hallie’s testimony that she felt scared and alarmed and the objective reasonable-person standard. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support reasonable grounds that Colby committed stalking and affirmed the two-year protective order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases, stalking can be proven through a pattern of unwanted surveillance, repeated proximity, hostile co-parenting messages, and violations of prior boundaries—even when the conduct happens around children’s events or other ordinary shared spaces. Build the case as a chronology, preserve app messages and location-monitoring evidence, and use prior Rule 11 agreements or injunctions to show notice, intent, and a continuing course of conduct."
In the Interest of G.S.S. and S.D.S., Children
COA11
In a Department-filed termination case, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 107.013(a)(1) required the trial court to appoint counsel for an indigent incarcerated father who appeared in opposition to termination. Although the record contained significant evidence of domestic violence, substance abuse, incarceration, and danger to the children, the appellate court focused on the threshold procedural issue: the father requested appointed counsel, was indigent, and opposed the suit, so the statute was triggered. Because the trial court denied counsel without a hearing, the court held that the father’s statutory right to counsel was violated and reversed the termination order as to him, remanding for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas termination cases, appointed-counsel issues are not housekeeping—they can undo an otherwise strong judgment. If an indigent parent appears in opposition to a government-filed termination suit, counsel must be appointed under Family Code § 107.013, including for incarcerated parents, and failure to do so is a reversal trap."
In Re Jim S. Adler & Associates, Frank W. Robertson, Michael Gomez, David J. Sacks, Jr., and Marco Antonio Rodriguez
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus and vacated a trial court’s order disqualifying one law firm from jointly representing a client and a second law firm sued in the same case. The plaintiff argued joint representation created a Rule 1.06 conflict because it sued one defendant for breach of an alleged fee contract and the other for tortious interference with that contract. The appellate court held disqualification was improper because both represented parties took the same present position: the alleged contract never existed or was invalid and unenforceable. The court emphasized that Rule 1.06 does not mandate disqualification based on a theoretical conflict created by an opponent’s pleadings; the movant must show a real, current, material adversity and resulting prejudice. Because no actual present conflict was shown, the trial court abused its discretion, and mandamus was the proper remedy.
Litigation Takeaway
"A disqualification motion cannot succeed just because opposing pleadings imagine a future conflict between jointly represented parties. In Texas litigation—including family cases—the movant must prove a real, present, material conflict and prejudice, not merely speculative adversity. If aligned clients are advancing the same defense, Rule 1.06 alone does not force separate counsel."
Hartley v. State
COA13
In Hartley v. State, the appellant argued that the written community-supervision order incorrectly gave him 116 days of jail-time credit instead of the 120 days orally pronounced by the trial court. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because, while the appeal was pending, Hartley was discharged from community supervision. Applying Texas mootness principles and Ex parte Canada, the court held that once Hartley was no longer confined, under supervision, or otherwise restrained by the challenged order, there was no live controversy and no meaningful relief the court could grant. Because no mootness exception was shown, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Timing can be everything. In family-law enforcement and contempt matters, complaints about jail credit, short-term confinement, temporary restrictions, or expiring compliance orders can become moot before an appeal is decided. If the challenged restraint may end quickly, lawyers should consider faster vehicles like mandamus, habeas, emergency relief, or immediate correction in the trial court, and build a record of any ongoing collateral consequences."
In the Interest of A.T.G., A.G.G., A.G.G. II, A.G.G., and A.G.G., Children
COA07
In In re A.T.G., the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s rights to two children after the record showed a long-running pattern of domestic violence against the mother, excessive corporal punishment of the children, and a home environment dominated by fear and aggression. Although sexual-abuse allegations that triggered the case became uncertain by trial, the court held that the remaining evidence independently satisfied Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court analyzed subsection (D) as addressing the children’s endangering conditions and surroundings and subsection (E) as addressing the father’s endangering conduct, concluding that repeated assaults, abusive discipline with objects, intimidation, and the children’s persistent fear were legally and factually sufficient under both grounds. The court therefore upheld termination and the related no-contact relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domestic violence is not collateral to custody or termination litigation—it is direct evidence of child endangerment. Even if one major allegation weakens, a well-developed record showing a pattern of violence, abusive discipline, intimidation, and child fear can still support severe restrictions or termination."
Michael Eugene Dreelan v. Martha Estupian Dreelan
COA05
In Dreelan v. Dreelan, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree finding that the husband committed both actual and constructive fraud on the community estate. The evidence showed he used his superior control over marital finances, along with a power of attorney signed by the wife, to sell the parties’ Forney home, divert the proceeds, and position the Terrell house as his separate property without the wife’s informed consent. The record also included evidence of transfers to a paramour, gifts to third parties, unaccounted cash withdrawals, and diverted business distributions. Applying Texas Family Code section 7.009 and established fraud-on-the-community principles, the court held that a spouse’s formal participation in a transaction does not defeat a fraud claim when that spouse did not knowingly consent to the ultimate disposition of community assets, and that fiduciary duties between spouses—and under a power of attorney—support relief. The court upheld reconstitution of the community estate and the $133,979.16 money judgment as part of a just-and-right division, rejecting the husband’s one-satisfaction challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
"Informed consent matters more than signatures. If one spouse uses control over finances, title, or a power of attorney to redirect community assets without full disclosure, Texas courts can find fraud on the community, reconstitute the estate, and award a money judgment. For trial lawyers, detailed tracing, fiduciary-duty evidence, and findings of fact can make or break these claims."