Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
863 opinions found
In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B.
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights after an independent Anders review found no nonfrivolous appellate issues. The court nevertheless specifically analyzed Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) under In re N.G., relying on evidence of severe abuse in the home, the father’s failure to accept responsibility, unresolved safety concerns despite service completion, and the absence of any therapeutic support for reunification. The court also held that appointed counsel in a parental-rights appeal may not withdraw merely because an Anders brief was filed; under In re P.M., counsel must show independent good cause to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas termination appeals, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) will get specific appellate review even in an Anders case, so trial counsel must build a record on abuse, exposure, accountability, and actual remediation—not just service completion. Appointed appellate counsel should also expect to remain on the case through any petition-for-review stage unless they can show good cause beyond filing an Anders brief."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Jesus Gregorio Lopez and Isela Flores Richardson
COA13
In this divorce appeal, the wife argued she lacked notice that a May 7 hearing would serve as the final trial and complained that the court ruled on disputed property issues without live testimony, based instead on attorney proffer and documents. The Thirteenth Court rejected those arguments because the record showed the case was orally set for trial on May 7, wife’s counsel acknowledged that understanding at the hearing, and the parties expressly agreed to proceed by proffer with documentary review. The court also found no reversible error regarding alleged post-hearing exhibits, a late-filed amended pleading, relief awarded in the decree, or findings and conclusions, and it affirmed the divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you agree on the record to try a divorce case by proffer, stipulation, and documents, you usually cannot wait until the judge seems unconvinced and then demand a full evidentiary hearing. Family-law lawyers should clarify whether a setting is final, object clearly to any late amendments or procedure they oppose, and preserve the record before agreeing to an informal trial format."
Vera v. State
COA03
In Vera v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed exclusion of a defense psychologist’s proposed testimony that stress-induced “fight-or-flight” physiology and alcohol effects reduced the defendant’s culpable mental state during a fatal bar fight. The court held the expert was qualified, but her opinions were too general and did not meaningfully connect the science to whether Vera intentionally or knowingly stabbed the victims; the testimony also risked confusing the jury by effectively smuggling voluntary-intoxication evidence in as a defense. The court further held that Vera was not entitled to a sudden-passion instruction because the escalating confrontation and intervening events did not amount to adequate cause that would render an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving family violence, child abuse, or coercive conduct, expert testimony about trauma, dysregulation, or “fight-or-flight” must be tightly tied to a specific legal issue and the party-specific facts. Generalized psychology that merely reframes intentional conduct as reactive can be excluded as unhelpful, confusing, or an improper excuse narrative."
Harolyn Graves-Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this aggravated-assault family-violence appeal, the defendant argued the trial court wrongly excluded handwritten letters and prison messages allegedly sent by the complainant that she wanted to use to impeach him and to show the nature of their relationship under article 38.371. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion because the defense did not properly authenticate the communications and did not satisfy Texas Rule of Evidence 613 by confronting the complainant with the specific statements before offering the writings as extrinsic impeachment evidence. The court also explained that article 38.371 does not override ordinary evidentiary requirements, so unauthenticated and unsupported relationship evidence may still be excluded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texts, jail messages, emails, and letters can be powerful family-violence evidence, but only if counsel lays the foundation. Authenticate the communication, connect it to the witness, give context, and if using it for impeachment, confront the witness with the exact statement first. Article 38.371 and broad “relationship evidence” arguments will not rescue sloppy predicate work."
Lartigue v. Farias
COA01
In Lartigue v. Farias, the First Court of Appeals held that a civil stalking claim under Chapter 85 was not subject to dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The dispute arose after Lartigue, in the context of separate unauthorized-practice litigation, sent repeated emails and placed repeated calls to attorney Farias that included abusive language, threats, and statements implying an in-person confrontation. Lartigue argued the communications were protected because they related to pending litigation and thus involved free speech and petitioning. The court rejected that framing and focused on the gravamen of the live claim: threatening, harassing, repeated conduct that allegedly caused fear and disrupted Farias’s work. Because the stalking claim was based on alleged intimidation rather than protected speech or petitioning activity, the TCPA did not apply at step one, so the court affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss without reaching prima facie proof or defenses.
Litigation Takeaway
"Not every communication connected to a lawsuit is TCPA-protected. When the real target of the claim is repeated threats, harassment, stalking, or intimidation, courts may stop the TCPA analysis at step one. In family-law cases, that makes pleading and framing critical: emphasize the coercive conduct, unwanted contacts, escalation, and safety impact—not just the fact that the parties were already in litigation."
Nunez v. Nichols
COA03
In Nunez v. Nichols, the Austin Court of Appeals considered whether sufficient evidence supported an order requiring a father to pay ongoing and retroactive support for his adult disabled daughter under Texas Family Code section 154.302, plus health-insurance and unreimbursed medical-expense obligations. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because it showed the daughter’s serious physical and psychiatric conditions began before age eighteen, continued into adulthood, and left her requiring substantial care and personal supervision while not capable of self-support. The father’s evidence of limited independence, including travel and a restricted driver’s license, went to weight rather than negating the statutory elements, and his expert did not provide a vocational basis to establish employability. The court therefore affirmed the support and medical-support portions of the order, but reversed and remanded the $25,468.46 attorney’s-fee award because the record lacked the detailed proof of hours, rates, and value of services required to support that amount.
Litigation Takeaway
"For adult disabled-child support cases, courts want functional proof, not just diagnoses: build a timeline showing pre-majority onset, current inability to be self-supporting, and the need for substantial day-to-day supervision. For opponents, isolated signs of independence are usually not enough without developed evidence of actual self-sufficiency. And regardless of who wins on the merits, an attorney’s-fee award can still be undone on appeal if counsel does not present disciplined lodestar-style proof."
Michael Colbert v. State of Texas
COA12
In Colbert v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld an assault/family-violence conviction even though the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution. The defendant argued on appeal that trying the case the day after he elected to represent himself violated Article 1.051(e) and due process, but the court held that complaint was not preserved because he did not object, request a continuance, or otherwise raise the issue in the trial court; in fact, he stated he was ready to proceed. On the merits, the court applied the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, concluding that the complainant’s 911 statements, her similar statements to the responding officer, and the defendant’s own admission that he may have hit her with the television were sufficient to support the finding of bodily injury despite her later recantation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Recantation does not erase family-violence evidence, and preservation matters. In family-law cases, judges may credit contemporaneous 911 calls, officer testimony, and party admissions over a later walk-back, so lawyers should gather and present that evidence early. And if notice or due-process problems arise in a rushed hearing, counsel must object, request specific relief, and make a record immediately or the complaint may be lost on appeal."
In re G.M.
COA02
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code Section 156.102 is triggered by the date a modification petition is filed, not the date the hearing occurs. Father filed within one year of the prior order and sought to change the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence, so he was required to file a sufficient supporting affidavit. After the trial court found the affidavit insufficient, Section 156.102(c) required it to deny the requested relief and refuse to proceed. By nevertheless conducting an evidentiary hearing and entering temporary orders, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you seek to change primary residence within one year of the last order, the affidavit requirement is a hard gatekeeper. The key date is the filing date, and once a court finds the affidavit insufficient, it cannot simply go forward with a hearing anyway. For movants, draft a fact-specific affidavit that tracks the statute; for respondents, press for an early ruling and preserve error if the court proceeds despite an insufficiency finding."
In the Interest of C.F., a Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights, concluding legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence that the parents used methamphetamine while caring for the infant, the child himself tested positive for methamphetamine, there were domestic-violence concerns, the home environment was unstable and unsafe, and the father later violated community supervision, was incarcerated, failed to complete services, and offered only a speculative post-release plan. Applying the Holley best-interest framework and sufficiency standards, the court held the trial court could reasonably infer ongoing danger and lack of stability from the father’s past and present conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts give heavy weight to concrete evidence of child endangerment—especially drug exposure, domestic violence, criminal instability, unsafe housing, and failure to complete services—and they may use past conduct to predict future risk. In any custody or termination case, promises of future improvement usually will not overcome a documented record of recent instability unless backed by credible, verifiable proof of rehabilitation, housing, employment, and safety."
In the Interest of D.J., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to D.J. As to Mother, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), a prior endangerment-based termination finding under subsection (M), and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on a pattern of evidence, including Mother’s prior endangerment termination history, the child’s positive drug test, Mother’s own positive hair-follicle test, missed testing, instability in housing and supervision, failure to know the child’s whereabouts, and inconsistent visitation. The court also rejected Mother’s argument that an earlier letter ruling controlled over the final judgment, reiterating that the signed order governs. As to Father, the court accepted appointed counsel’s Anders brief, conducted an independent review, found no nonfrivolous appellate issue, and affirmed termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Family courts decide endangerment and best-interest disputes by looking at the whole pattern, not isolated recent improvements. Positive drug tests, missed tests, instability, prior CPS history, and inconsistent contact can combine to support severe relief, while informal letter rulings or oral pronouncements do not override the signed order."