Opinion Library

In the Interest of A.A.C.C., a Child

COA10

In *In the Interest of A.A.C.C., a Child*, the Tenth Court of Appeals held that a father’s bill of review attacking a termination order was barred by Texas Family Code section 161.211(a) because it was filed more than six months after the order was signed. The father argued he had already been adjudicated the child’s father in a separate parentage case and therefore should not have been terminated as merely an alleged father under section 161.002(b). But the court focused on procedure and finality: the termination order expressly relied on section 161.002(b), and the father filed his collateral attack well outside the six-month statutory deadline. The court also held that because he filed no written response to the Department’s summary-judgment motion, he failed to preserve arguments about misclassification, evidentiary insufficiency, lack of counsel, and invalid waiver of service. The Department’s summary-judgment evidence conclusively established the statutory basis for termination and the untimeliness of the bill of review, so summary judgment was proper.

Litigation Takeaway

"Deadlines and preservation can decide a family-law case before the merits are ever reached. If a termination order is signed under Family Code section 161.002(b), any direct or collateral attack must be pursued within the six-month window in section 161.211(a), and any reason the statute supposedly does not apply must be raised in a written trial-court response—not for the first time on appeal."

Property Division

Aliza Groups, Inc. v. Roshan K. Noorani

COA02

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment declaring void a deed that purported to transfer a married couple’s community homestead because the named grantor, Karim Noorani, did not sign it and the son who signed Karim’s name had no authority to do so. The court applied Texas law that a forged deed is void, not voidable, and passes no title. Roshan Noorani’s summary-judgment evidence directly established that Karim never signed the deed and that neither spouse authorized the son to execute any deed or lien on the property. The buyer’s agency and equity arguments failed because they did not create a genuine fact issue on authorization, and its appellate authority theory was not preserved because it did not match the theory raised in the trial court. The court therefore affirmed the order quieting title in Roshan’s favor.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-property litigation, especially homestead disputes, an unauthorized signature on a deed can be attacked as a void forgery, and vague claims that a child or other family member had “authority” will not defeat summary judgment without competent evidence of actual authorization. Lock down the record early on who signed, who authorized, and whether the property was community homestead property."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Lartigue v. Farias

COA01

In Lartigue v. Farias, the First Court of Appeals held that a civil stalking claim under Chapter 85 was not subject to dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The dispute arose after Lartigue, in the context of separate unauthorized-practice litigation, sent repeated emails and placed repeated calls to attorney Farias that included abusive language, threats, and statements implying an in-person confrontation. Lartigue argued the communications were protected because they related to pending litigation and thus involved free speech and petitioning. The court rejected that framing and focused on the gravamen of the live claim: threatening, harassing, repeated conduct that allegedly caused fear and disrupted Farias’s work. Because the stalking claim was based on alleged intimidation rather than protected speech or petitioning activity, the TCPA did not apply at step one, so the court affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss without reaching prima facie proof or defenses.

Litigation Takeaway

"Not every communication connected to a lawsuit is TCPA-protected. When the real target of the claim is repeated threats, harassment, stalking, or intimidation, courts may stop the TCPA analysis at step one. In family-law cases, that makes pleading and framing critical: emphasize the coercive conduct, unwanted contacts, escalation, and safety impact—not just the fact that the parties were already in litigation."

Evidence

Harolyn Graves-Johnson v. The State of Texas

COA14

In this aggravated-assault family-violence appeal, the defendant argued the trial court wrongly excluded handwritten letters and prison messages allegedly sent by the complainant that she wanted to use to impeach him and to show the nature of their relationship under article 38.371. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion because the defense did not properly authenticate the communications and did not satisfy Texas Rule of Evidence 613 by confronting the complainant with the specific statements before offering the writings as extrinsic impeachment evidence. The court also explained that article 38.371 does not override ordinary evidentiary requirements, so unauthenticated and unsupported relationship evidence may still be excluded.

Litigation Takeaway

"Texts, jail messages, emails, and letters can be powerful family-violence evidence, but only if counsel lays the foundation. Authenticate the communication, connect it to the witness, give context, and if using it for impeachment, confront the witness with the exact statement first. Article 38.371 and broad “relationship evidence” arguments will not rescue sloppy predicate work."

Appeal and Mandamus

In re Anabel Lopez Perez

COA03

In In re Anabel Lopez Perez, the relator sought mandamus relief in the Third Court of Appeals to force an Austin County Court at Law judge to execute or clarify a QDRO arising from a divorce. The court did not reach the merits of the QDRO dispute. Instead, it analyzed Texas Government Code sections 22.221 and 22.201(d) and held that its ordinary mandamus power extends only to trial judges within its appellate district, and Austin County is not in the Third Court’s district. The relator also failed to show that mandamus was necessary to protect or enforce the Third Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The petition was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Litigation Takeaway

"Before filing mandamus in any post-divorce property case, especially a QDRO or decree-clarification dispute, confirm that the respondent judge sits within the appellate court’s territorial district. A strong merits argument cannot overcome filing in the wrong court, and family-law subject matter does not create mandamus jurisdiction."

Appeal and Mandamus

In re O.L.M., a Child

COA01

In In re O.L.M., a Child, the mother tried to directly appeal temporary orders entered in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship. The First Court of Appeals treated the issue as purely jurisdictional and explained that Texas appellate courts may review interlocutory orders only when a statute expressly permits it. Relying on Texas Family Code section 105.001(e), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014, and prior cases, the court held that temporary SAPCR modification orders are not subject to interlocutory appeal. Because the mother used a notice of appeal instead of the proper potential vehicle of mandamus, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the merits.

Litigation Takeaway

"Do not assume an urgent temporary custody or SAPCR modification order can be appealed immediately. In Texas, temporary modification orders are generally not directly appealable, so lawyers should analyze appellate jurisdiction first, preserve a mandamus-ready record, and move quickly on mandamus if immediate review is truly necessary."

In the Interest of A.M., a Child

COA06

The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to A.M. after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support Father’s predicate grounds under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (N) and the best-interest findings as to both parents. The court analyzed Father’s repeated incarcerations, criminal conduct, long-term absence, and inability to provide a stable home holistically rather than in isolation, holding that this pattern constituted endangering conduct and constructive abandonment. It also held that A.M.’s history of instability, trauma, failed placements, both parents’ continued incarceration, and evidence that she was moving toward acceptance of adoption supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in her best interest.

Litigation Takeaway

"In termination and other family-law cases, incarceration rarely stands alone—the winning record ties repeated criminal conduct and absence to a larger pattern of instability, lack of caregiving, and the child’s need for permanence. Trial lawyers should build a child-specific chronology showing how parental unavailability affected this child, because appellate courts will review endangerment holistically and defer heavily to credibility-based best-interest findings."

In the Interest of C.F., a Child

COA11

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights, concluding legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence that the parents used methamphetamine while caring for the infant, the child himself tested positive for methamphetamine, there were domestic-violence concerns, the home environment was unstable and unsafe, and the father later violated community supervision, was incarcerated, failed to complete services, and offered only a speculative post-release plan. Applying the Holley best-interest framework and sufficiency standards, the court held the trial court could reasonably infer ongoing danger and lack of stability from the father’s past and present conduct.

Litigation Takeaway

"Courts give heavy weight to concrete evidence of child endangerment—especially drug exposure, domestic violence, criminal instability, unsafe housing, and failure to complete services—and they may use past conduct to predict future risk. In any custody or termination case, promises of future improvement usually will not overcome a documented record of recent instability unless backed by credible, verifiable proof of rehabilitation, housing, employment, and safety."

In the Interest of D.J., a Child

COA02

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to D.J. As to Mother, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), a prior endangerment-based termination finding under subsection (M), and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on a pattern of evidence, including Mother’s prior endangerment termination history, the child’s positive drug test, Mother’s own positive hair-follicle test, missed testing, instability in housing and supervision, failure to know the child’s whereabouts, and inconsistent visitation. The court also rejected Mother’s argument that an earlier letter ruling controlled over the final judgment, reiterating that the signed order governs. As to Father, the court accepted appointed counsel’s Anders brief, conducted an independent review, found no nonfrivolous appellate issue, and affirmed termination.

Litigation Takeaway

"Family courts decide endangerment and best-interest disputes by looking at the whole pattern, not isolated recent improvements. Positive drug tests, missed tests, instability, prior CPS history, and inconsistent contact can combine to support severe relief, while informal letter rulings or oral pronouncements do not override the signed order."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Michael Colbert v. State of Texas

COA12

In Colbert v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld an assault/family-violence conviction even though the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution. The defendant argued on appeal that trying the case the day after he elected to represent himself violated Article 1.051(e) and due process, but the court held that complaint was not preserved because he did not object, request a continuance, or otherwise raise the issue in the trial court; in fact, he stated he was ready to proceed. On the merits, the court applied the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, concluding that the complainant’s 911 statements, her similar statements to the responding officer, and the defendant’s own admission that he may have hit her with the television were sufficient to support the finding of bodily injury despite her later recantation.

Litigation Takeaway

"Recantation does not erase family-violence evidence, and preservation matters. In family-law cases, judges may credit contemporaneous 911 calls, officer testimony, and party admissions over a later walk-back, so lawyers should gather and present that evidence early. And if notice or due-process problems arise in a rushed hearing, counsel must object, request specific relief, and make a record immediately or the complaint may be lost on appeal."