Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
863 opinions found
Armando Jesus Pedraza v. The State of Texas
COA01
In *Armando Jesus Pedraza v. The State of Texas*, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a 30-year punishment judgment after Pedraza argued his lawyer was ineffective during punishment. He claimed counsel should have objected to hearsay testimony about an online article describing prior violent conduct and wrongly advised him that he could testify while still invoking the Fifth Amendment about pending charges. The court applied *Strickland* and held the record was too undeveloped to show deficient performance or prejudice. Because counsel had no opportunity to explain the reasons for not objecting or for calling Pedraza to testify, the court would not speculate on a silent record, especially given the already extensive punishment evidence of prior violence, convictions, bond violations, and pending charges. The court therefore affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case overlaps with criminal exposure, lawyers must prepare clients carefully before they testify because taking the stand may waive any ability to refuse related cross-examination. The case also shows that appellate complaints about bad evidence or bad strategy usually fail without a well-developed record explaining counsel’s choices, so trial lawyers should preserve objections, seek limiting rulings when appropriate, and build a record if strategy may later be challenged."
Estrada v. State
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed Estrada’s conviction for repeated protective-order violations. The State proved two violations within twelve months: Estrada’s contact with the protected person at the airport despite a no-contact order, and a later incident in which the complainant called 911 reporting that he came to her home and strangled her. Although the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution, the court held the trial court properly admitted the 911 call and EMS records because they were created during an ongoing emergency and for medical-response purposes, making them admissible under hearsay principles and non-testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excusing a juror for cause and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence cases, a later recantation usually does not erase strong contemporaneous evidence. 911 audio, EMS records, photos, neighbor testimony, and other emergency-response evidence can outweigh a complainant’s later change of story and may strongly affect protective-order, custody, and divorce litigation. Also, reconciliation does not suspend a protective order—only a court can modify it."
In re Diamond
COA05
In this original proceeding, the Dallas Court of Appeals denied a relator's petition for writ of mandamus challenging temporary orders and a related income withholding order issued during a SAPCR modification case. The court applied the standard set forth in In re Prudential, determining that the relator failed to prove the trial court clearly abused its discretion or that there was no adequate remedy by ordinary appeal. Beyond the merits, the court took the significant procedural step of striking the relator's petition and appendix for containing unredacted sensitive information, such as minor children's identifying data, in violation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9.
Litigation Takeaway
"Urgency in family law modification cases does not automatically entitle a party to mandamus relief; you must still provide a record that proves a clear abuse of discretion and the inadequacy of a standard appeal. Additionally, always double-check your redactions, as a violation of Rule 9.9 regarding sensitive data can lead the court to strike your entire filing."
In re Zermeno
COA07
In In re Zermeno, the Amarillo Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus after a trial court’s temporary orders named Father a joint managing conservator despite uncontroverted evidence that he had committed family violence against Mother within two years before the divorce was filed. The court focused on Texas Family Code section 153.004(b), explaining that the statute is not just a factor in the best-interest analysis; it prohibits appointment of joint managing conservators when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of physical abuse by one parent against the other. Because Father admitted multiple assaults, including one shortly before separation, and Mother and the parties’ adult children corroborated the violence, the trial court misapplied the law to essentially undisputed facts. The appellate court held that mandamus was the proper remedy for the unlawful temporary order and directed the trial court to vacate it.
Litigation Takeaway
"When credible evidence establishes a recent history or pattern of family violence, a Texas trial court cannot treat joint managing conservatorship as a compromise option. Family Code section 153.004(b) creates a hard statutory limit on the court’s discretion, and mandamus is available to correct temporary orders that ignore that limit."
In the Interest of M.L.J.
COA14
In this termination appeal, a Fourteenth Court dissent concluded that a parent’s unsupported claim of “Indian heritage” did not trigger ICWA. The dissent focused on ICWA’s statutory definition of an “Indian child,” emphasizing that the record contained no evidence the child was a tribal member, eligible for membership, or the biological child of a tribal member. Because neither parent nor the child was registered with a tribe, no tribe-specific evidence was offered, and no documentation was produced despite repeated opportunities, the dissent reasoned the trial court had no “reason to know” ICWA applied under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). The dissent also criticized reliance on 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 to impose a broader inquiry duty based on mere suspicion, and would have held that ancestry alone is insufficient to trigger ICWA’s heightened protections.
Litigation Takeaway
"If ICWA is in play, vague statements about Native or Indian heritage are not enough. Family-law litigators should build a tribe-specific record on membership, eligibility, and parental tribal status early, because unsupported ancestry claims can create appellate risk, while a well-developed record can support the argument that ICWA was never triggered."
In the Interest of O.A., a Minor Child
COA05
In this case, a father sought to reduce his monthly child support payments, claiming his income had decreased and he had two additional children to support. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the modification. The court emphasized that under Texas Family Code § 156.401(a), a person seeking a change must prove a 'material and substantial change' by providing clear evidence of both their financial situation at the time of the original order and their current circumstances. Because the father failed to admit recent financial documents like pay stubs into evidence—relying instead on testimony and outdated tax returns—the court held he did not meet his legal burden of proof.
Litigation Takeaway
"To successfully modify child support, you must present a complete evidentiary record; testimony alone is often insufficient without supporting documents like current pay stubs and tax returns to prove a material change in financial circumstances."
Sheehan v. Sheehan
COA11
In Sheehan v. Sheehan, the divorce decree awarded the wife $64,661.44 from a BB&T account in the husband’s name, but he later depleted the account and failed to deliver the funds. On enforcement, the husband argued that a money judgment would improperly modify the decree because the specific account no longer contained the money. The Eleventh Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that Texas Family Code §§ 9.002, 9.006, and especially 9.010 allow a trial court to enforce an existing property award through a money judgment when direct delivery of the awarded property is no longer an adequate remedy. Because the decree had already awarded the wife that sum, reducing the undelivered award to a money judgment did not change the substantive property division; it simply implemented it. The court also affirmed attorney’s fees under § 9.014.
Litigation Takeaway
"A spouse cannot defeat a divorce decree’s property award by draining the account or liquidating the asset from which payment was supposed to come. If the decree already awarded a sum certain, the court can enforce that award with a money judgment—and attorney’s fees—without impermissibly modifying the decree."
In the Interest of S.M.T. and S.J.T., Children
COA14
In a pending SAPCR, the appellant tried to immediately appeal trial-court orders denying motions to correct the reporter’s record and clerk’s record. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the final-judgment rule, noted that interlocutory orders are appealable only when a statute expressly authorizes it, and found no statute permitting an interlocutory appeal from record-correction rulings. Because the challenged orders were purely interlocutory and did not dispose of all parties and claims, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot create appellate jurisdiction by appealing a procedural ruling about the contents of the record. In family-law cases, record-correction disputes usually must be handled through the proper correction procedures, preserved for review after a final judgment, or—if truly extraordinary—addressed by mandamus rather than a stand-alone interlocutory appeal."
In the Interest of B.C., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals largely upheld a post-answer default SAPCR order against a pro se father. The court concluded the record showed he had actual notice of the trial setting, his eve-of-trial email continuance request was not verified or supported by affidavit as Rule 251 requires, and his post-judgment effort to set aside the default did not establish reversible error under the standards governing post-answer defaults. The court also rejected his other complaints as unpreserved, inadequately briefed, or contradicted by the record. But it modified the final order to strike the child’s surname change because the mother never pleaded for that relief, and a court may not grant affirmative relief not supported by the live pleadings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Two family-law lessons stand out: post-answer defaults are hard to undo without a properly supported Craddock record, and even in SAPCR cases a final order cannot include affirmative relief that was never pleaded. Plead every item of requested relief, and if you seek to set aside a default, use a properly signed, sworn, and fully developed motion."
Bradford v. State
COA10
In Bradford v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a six-year-old child’s three out-of-court identifications of her assailant were admissible as excited utterances under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(2), even though the trial court declined to admit them under Article 38.072. The court focused on whether the child remained dominated by fear, pain, and emotional shock from the assault, and concluded that the record showed continuous stress from the immediate porch disclosure through later hospital statements. The court also rejected the Confrontation Clause challenge, reasoning that the statements were spontaneous, made to the child’s mother during crisis and treatment, and were non-testimonial rather than formal accusations for prosecution. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a child’s abuse disclosure does not fit a specialized hearsay statute, do not assume admissibility is lost. Build a Rule 803(2) record showing spontaneity, timing, visible distress, injuries, and continuing trauma; in family court, that can support admission of immediate child disclosures in emergency custody, protective-order, and supervised-possession disputes. To defeat admission, focus on reflection, prompting, intervening calm, and litigation-driven questioning."