Opinion Library

Property Division Enforcement

Sheehan v. Sheehan

COA11

In Sheehan v. Sheehan, the divorce decree awarded the wife $64,661.44 from a BB&T account in the husband’s name, but he later depleted the account and failed to deliver the funds. On enforcement, the husband argued that a money judgment would improperly modify the decree because the specific account no longer contained the money. The Eleventh Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that Texas Family Code §§ 9.002, 9.006, and especially 9.010 allow a trial court to enforce an existing property award through a money judgment when direct delivery of the awarded property is no longer an adequate remedy. Because the decree had already awarded the wife that sum, reducing the undelivered award to a money judgment did not change the substantive property division; it simply implemented it. The court also affirmed attorney’s fees under § 9.014.

Litigation Takeaway

"A spouse cannot defeat a divorce decree’s property award by draining the account or liquidating the asset from which payment was supposed to come. If the decree already awarded a sum certain, the court can enforce that award with a money judgment—and attorney’s fees—without impermissibly modifying the decree."

Evidence

Bradford v. State

COA10

In Bradford v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a six-year-old child’s three out-of-court identifications of her assailant were admissible as excited utterances under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(2), even though the trial court declined to admit them under Article 38.072. The court focused on whether the child remained dominated by fear, pain, and emotional shock from the assault, and concluded that the record showed continuous stress from the immediate porch disclosure through later hospital statements. The court also rejected the Confrontation Clause challenge, reasoning that the statements were spontaneous, made to the child’s mother during crisis and treatment, and were non-testimonial rather than formal accusations for prosecution. The conviction was affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"If a child’s abuse disclosure does not fit a specialized hearsay statute, do not assume admissibility is lost. Build a Rule 803(2) record showing spontaneity, timing, visible distress, injuries, and continuing trauma; in family court, that can support admission of immediate child disclosures in emergency custody, protective-order, and supervised-possession disputes. To defeat admission, focus on reflection, prompting, intervening calm, and litigation-driven questioning."

In the Interest of S.M.T. and S.J.T., Children

COA14

In a pending SAPCR, the appellant tried to immediately appeal trial-court orders denying motions to correct the reporter’s record and clerk’s record. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the final-judgment rule, noted that interlocutory orders are appealable only when a statute expressly authorizes it, and found no statute permitting an interlocutory appeal from record-correction rulings. Because the challenged orders were purely interlocutory and did not dispose of all parties and claims, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Litigation Takeaway

"You cannot create appellate jurisdiction by appealing a procedural ruling about the contents of the record. In family-law cases, record-correction disputes usually must be handled through the proper correction procedures, preserved for review after a final judgment, or—if truly extraordinary—addressed by mandamus rather than a stand-alone interlocutory appeal."

Divorce

In re Marriage of Runyon

COA10

In In re Marriage of Runyon, a husband challenged a divorce decree that awarded his wife a $47,990 money judgment, allowed her to relocate their child to Florida, and ordered $1,840 in monthly child support. The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on all counts. The court analyzed the property division under the Murff factors, concluding that the husband's high income as an anesthesiologist compared to the wife's lower earnings justified an unequal division. Regarding the move to Florida, the court applied the Lenz factors and found relocation was in the child's best interest due to the presence of extended family. The court held that the trial court acted within its broad discretion and that the wife's legal pleadings were sufficient to support the remedies awarded.

Litigation Takeaway

"Trial courts have immense discretion in dividing property and determining a child's residence; if there is a significant income gap or a clear best-interest benefit to relocation (like family support), appellate courts are highly unlikely to reverse the decision."

Modifying Child Support

In the Interest of O.A., a Minor Child

COA05

In this case, a father sought to reduce his monthly child support payments, claiming his income had decreased and he had two additional children to support. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the modification. The court emphasized that under Texas Family Code § 156.401(a), a person seeking a change must prove a 'material and substantial change' by providing clear evidence of both their financial situation at the time of the original order and their current circumstances. Because the father failed to admit recent financial documents like pay stubs into evidence—relying instead on testimony and outdated tax returns—the court held he did not meet his legal burden of proof.

Litigation Takeaway

"To successfully modify child support, you must present a complete evidentiary record; testimony alone is often insufficient without supporting documents like current pay stubs and tax returns to prove a material change in financial circumstances."

Child Custody

In the Interest of B.C., a Child

COA02

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals largely upheld a post-answer default SAPCR order against a pro se father. The court concluded the record showed he had actual notice of the trial setting, his eve-of-trial email continuance request was not verified or supported by affidavit as Rule 251 requires, and his post-judgment effort to set aside the default did not establish reversible error under the standards governing post-answer defaults. The court also rejected his other complaints as unpreserved, inadequately briefed, or contradicted by the record. But it modified the final order to strike the child’s surname change because the mother never pleaded for that relief, and a court may not grant affirmative relief not supported by the live pleadings.

Litigation Takeaway

"Two family-law lessons stand out: post-answer defaults are hard to undo without a properly supported Craddock record, and even in SAPCR cases a final order cannot include affirmative relief that was never pleaded. Plead every item of requested relief, and if you seek to set aside a default, use a properly signed, sworn, and fully developed motion."

In the Interest of J.G., J.G., and A.J.S., Children

COA13

In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant challenged a February 3, 2026 final order appointing a sole managing conservator, but the trial court later vacated that same order on February 19, 2026. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals treated the case as a pure jurisdictional question, explaining that once the underlying final order was vacated, there was no longer a live, final appealable order for the court to review. Relying on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), the court granted the appellant’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the appeal as moot without reaching any substantive conservatorship or child-related issues.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law appeals, always confirm that the order named in the notice of appeal is still in effect. If the trial court vacates the order after the appeal is filed, the appeal may become moot immediately, appellate deadlines may shift, and counsel may need to dismiss, abate, or perfect a new appeal from any replacement order."

In re Diamond

COA05

In this original proceeding, the Dallas Court of Appeals denied a relator's petition for writ of mandamus challenging temporary orders and a related income withholding order issued during a SAPCR modification case. The court applied the standard set forth in In re Prudential, determining that the relator failed to prove the trial court clearly abused its discretion or that there was no adequate remedy by ordinary appeal. Beyond the merits, the court took the significant procedural step of striking the relator's petition and appendix for containing unredacted sensitive information, such as minor children's identifying data, in violation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9.

Litigation Takeaway

"Urgency in family law modification cases does not automatically entitle a party to mandamus relief; you must still provide a record that proves a clear abuse of discretion and the inadequacy of a standard appeal. Additionally, always double-check your redactions, as a violation of Rule 9.9 regarding sensitive data can lead the court to strike your entire filing."

Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger v. Deere Credit, Inc.

COA11

The Eastland Court of Appeals reversed a restricted-appeal default judgment entered against an individual defendant and a limited partnership. The court held that Shelia Unger’s signed pro se letter, which denied liability, asserted that payments had been made and the equipment returned, and asked the court to dismiss the suit, was sufficient to constitute an answer on her own behalf because Texas courts liberally construe informal pro se filings that give fair notice of a defensive position. The same letter could not serve as a valid appearance for the limited partnership because a non-attorney cannot represent an entity. Even so, the court held the trial court erred by treating the record as though no response existed and by signing a default judgment the same day the motion was filed, without notice or an opportunity for the entity to cure the representation defect. The judgment was reversed and remanded as to both defendants.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law-adjacent default practice, any timely pro se filing by an individual that disputes the claims may defeat a no-answer default, even if informal. And if a business entity attempts to respond through a non-lawyer, the safer course is to force counsel to appear and give notice and a chance to cure—not rush to default—because due-process defects can unravel the judgment on restricted appeal."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Schrotel v. State

COA10

In Schrotel v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to uphold a family-violence assault conviction arising from a dispute between spouses. The complainant testified that her husband hit her with an exercise ball, put his hand on her throat, pushed her down, and kicked or stomped on her leg, causing pain. The responding officer did not witness the assault but observed that the complainant was upset and crying, saw a heel-shaped red mark on her leg, and photographed it. On appeal, the appellant argued the complainant was not credible and that inconsistencies between her testimony, the officer’s testimony, and his denial made the evidence insufficient. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court deferred to the jury’s role in resolving credibility and conflicts in the evidence, considered the cumulative force of the testimony and corroboration, and concluded that the complainant’s testimony plus modest contemporaneous corroboration was enough for a rational jury to find bodily injury to a family member beyond a reasonable doubt.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, a factfinder can credit one party’s detailed testimony even when the other party flatly denies it. You do not need perfect corroboration; modest supporting proof like photographs, officer observations, distress, or a prompt outcry may be enough to support findings affecting protective orders, conservatorship, possession, and related divorce issues."