Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
863 opinions found
Lind v. M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC and The YoungESTone, LLC
COA10
In Lind v. M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a defendant who was properly served with the original petition but never answered did not have to be re-served with a later amended petition unless the amendment sought a more onerous judgment. Here, the amended petition made only corrective, non-substantive changes—such as fixing a name, counsel information, and service allegations—and did not change the claims, facts, or relief sought against Lind. Applying Texas default-judgment law and the restricted-appeal standard, the court concluded no service error appeared on the face of the record. The court also upheld the damages award, recognizing that default does not admit unliquidated damages or causation, but finding no reversible error in the proof presented.
Litigation Takeaway
"In default cases, the key question is not whether an amended petition became the live pleading, but whether it materially increased the responding party’s exposure. In family-law cases, re-service may be unnecessary for cleanup amendments, but if an amendment adds harsher conservatorship terms, broader property relief, fees, injunctions, or expanded enforcement remedies, failing to re-serve can jeopardize the default."
Fuhrman v. Fuhrman
COA09
In Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, the Ninth Court of Appeals held that detailed tax-allocation provisions in an agreed divorce decree could be enforced as a contract in a separate post-divorce civil suit. The decree required Deloitte to prepare the parties’ 2020 returns, made Douglas responsible for the first $270,000 of 2020 federal income tax, and required the parties to split any excess equally. After Douglas paid his tax liability and demanded reimbursement, Nancy refused, arguing in part that Douglas had not fully performed because he did not provide a K-1. The court rejected that argument, concluding the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Douglas performed, tendered performance, or was excused, and that Nancy breached by failing to pay her allocated share. Because Douglas supported his calculation with returns, testimony, and a spreadsheet, the court affirmed a $187,244 damages award and $30,782.58 in attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If an agreed divorce decree allocates a financial obligation with commercial-contract precision, a former spouse may be able to enforce it later through a straightforward breach-of-contract suit and recover fees. For litigators, the lesson is to draft tax, indemnity, reimbursement, and equalization clauses with clear formulas, deadlines, and document-sharing duties—and to prove or defend those claims with actual evidence, not generalized complaints."
In re Megan Leigh Burch
COA14
In this original proceeding arising from a Brazoria County SAPCR, Megan Leigh Burch sought mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate an order denying her motion to exclude an expert witness and to narrow a previously ordered child custody evaluation. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the usual mandamus framework, requiring a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal, and emphasized that the relator bears the burden to provide a sufficient record and legal showing. Because Burch did not establish that the trial court’s expert-related and custody-evaluation rulings met that demanding standard, the court denied mandamus relief in full.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus is usually a poor vehicle for challenging expert rulings or the scope of a child custody evaluation in a Texas custody case unless you can build a tight record showing both a clear legal error and harm that ordinary appeal cannot fix. Preserve specific objections, propose narrower protections, and develop evidence of irreparable harm in the trial court rather than relying on generalized complaints about bias, unreliability, or overbreadth."
In re EOG Resources, Inc.
COA04
In this Texas mandamus proceeding, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that EOG’s disclosure of a redacted legal memorandum and an internal email referencing counsel’s advice did not waive attorney-client privilege as to other withheld title opinions, memoranda, and communications in underlying probate litigation over mineral interests. The court found EOG established a prima facie privilege claim through its privilege log, affidavits, and in camera submission, then rejected waiver because Rule 511 requires disclosure of a significant part of the privileged matter itself—not merely documents on the same subject or evidence that a party received and acted on legal advice. The court also rejected offensive-use waiver because EOG was only defending against claims and was not seeking affirmative relief. Because compelled disclosure of privileged material has no adequate appellate remedy, the court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its production order.
Litigation Takeaway
"A partial disclosure does not open the whole lawyer file. In Texas family litigation, opposing counsel cannot prove waiver just by pointing to a redacted memo, an email mentioning legal advice, or testimony that a client acted after consulting counsel; they must show the disclosure revealed a significant part of the withheld communication itself. And offensive-use waiver remains narrow when your client is asserting defenses rather than affirmative claims."
In the Interest of I.J.W. and M.R.W., Children
COA08
In a suit to modify the parent-child relationship, the father tried to overturn a default modification order through a restricted appeal, arguing defects in substituted service, the return of service, default-related filings, and notice of judgment. The Eighth Court of Appeals first held that the father's separate bill of review did not disqualify him from pursuing a restricted appeal because a bill of review is an independent proceeding, not a Rule 329b post-judgment motion. But the court still affirmed because restricted appeals require error to appear on the face of the appellate record, and the key service and default documents father challenged were not included in the clerk's or reporter's record and appeared only in appellate appendices, which the court could not consider.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bill of review does not block a restricted appeal, so defaulted family-law litigants may be able to pursue both remedies. But restricted appeals live or die on the actual appellate record: if the service papers, military-status filing, last-known-address certificate, or notice documents are missing from the record, the appellate court will not consider defects shown only in brief appendices."
Leonard v. Wooten and Ellison
COA05
In Leonard v. Wooten and Ellison, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defamation suit based on statements in an affidavit filed to obtain a TRO in a child-custody proceeding arose from protected petitioning activity under the TCPA. The court focused on the plaintiffs’ own allegations, which showed the challenged statements were made in a sworn filing submitted to a court for judicial relief. It then held that the judicial-proceedings privilege independently barred the defamation claim because statements in affidavits and other court-filed papers that bear some relation to the proceeding are absolutely privileged, even if alleged to be false or malicious. Because Leonard established that defense as a matter of law, the court reversed the TCPA denial by operation of law and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases, allegations made in affidavits or other filings submitted to obtain court relief—especially emergency custody relief—may be both TCPA-protected petitioning activity and absolutely privileged against later defamation claims. The practical lesson is to challenge allegedly false statements inside the family case when possible, and to draft emergency affidavits carefully so they stay tied to the relief requested and the issues before the court."
Arellano v. Arrellano
COA04
After a decedent’s children sued to void a lien on family property, the surviving spouse intervened claiming homestead rights. The trial court struck her intervention for lack of a justiciable interest, then later entered a final judgment declaring she had no homestead interest and assessed attorney’s fees against her. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the order striking the intervention was interlocutory, so it did not start plenary-power deadlines and instead merged into the final judgment, leaving the struck intervenor bound by and able to appeal the final judgment. But because the strike was based on a jurisdictional lack of justiciable interest, the trial court could not then adjudicate the merits of the intervenor’s homestead claim. The appellate court therefore vacated the homestead merits declaration, affirmed the interlocutory-jurisdiction/plenary-power ruling, and remanded for further proceedings on attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you successfully strike an intervention, do not overreach in the final judgment. A struck intervenor is still bound until final judgment and can appeal, but once the court rules the intervenor lacks a justiciable interest, it cannot also decide that person’s substantive property, homestead, custody, or possession claims without an independent jurisdictional basis."
In re H.R.J., J.G.J., T.J.P., and L.P.
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and a best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on Mother’s ongoing illegal drug abuse, three prior removals tied to her addiction, and her decision to leave one child with that child’s father despite a protective order protecting the child from him. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations after a bench trial, the court held that this pattern showed both an endangering environment and a continuing course of endangering conduct, and that the same evidence supported termination as being in the children’s best interests. The court also emphasized that due process required review of both (D) and (E) findings because of their future collateral consequences under § 161.001(b)(1)(M).
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are built through pattern evidence, not just proof of a single injury. Repeated drug abuse, prior removals, instability, and exposing a child to a dangerous or court-restrained adult can together support both predicate termination grounds and best-interest findings. On appeal, lawyers must separately challenge or defend subsection (D) and (E) findings because those findings can affect future cases involving other children."
Peele v. State
COA04
In *Peele v. State*, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for indecency with a child and, in doing so, offered a useful evidence lesson for family-law cases built around a child’s disclosure. The key dispute was whether the child’s mother could repeat the child’s accusation even though the State initially invoked hearsay theories that did not cleanly fit the record and conceded the mother was not the Article 38.072 outcry witness. The court still affirmed because the complainant herself testified directly to the touching, the defense’s hearsay complaint did not produce reversible harm, and the record otherwise supported the verdict. The opinion underscores that appellate courts focus not just on whether “outcry” procedures were followed, but on specificity of objections, alternative admissibility theories, preservation, and whether any evidentiary error likely affected the outcome.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-disclosure cases, hearsay fights are won on precision and preservation, not labels. If you object, force the court to identify the exact basis for admission, raise all applicable grounds, and preserve harm each time the same statement comes in. If you offer the evidence, do not rely on vague “outcry” language—build a specific evidentiary path and corroborate the disclosure so any error is harmless."
White v. White
COA12
In White v. White, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that divorce-decree payments labeled as “spousal maintenance” were not true Chapter 8 maintenance because, in substance, they were installment payments for the wife’s equity in the marital home and community business interests. The court looked past the decree’s labels and contempt language and focused on the obligation’s actual purpose under the parties’ mediated settlement agreement. Because the $175,000 obligation functioned as a property-division buyout under Family Code section 7.006 rather than periodic support from future income under Chapter 8, the trial court properly refused contempt enforcement. The wife could still recover arrearages and a money judgment, but contempt was unavailable.
Litigation Takeaway
"Labels do not control enforcement. If a payment stream is really a deferred property buyout, calling it “spousal maintenance” will not make it contempt-enforceable. Texas family lawyers should clearly separate true Chapter 8 maintenance from property-equalization payments at the drafting stage and should evaluate the substance of the obligation before filing or resisting contempt."