Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
863 opinions found
In the Interest of A.C. and E.C., Jr., Children
COA06
In a termination-of-parental-rights appeal from Gregg County, Mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s predicate findings and best-interest determination. The Sixth Court of Appeals (Texarkana) applied the clear-and-convincing evidence standard and the Supreme Court’s modern sufficiency framework, emphasizing deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations and reasonable inferences while reviewing the entire record “holistically.” Because endangerment findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) have collateral consequences in future cases, the court conducted mandatory review of those challenged grounds and held the evidence legally and factually sufficient to prove (D) (endangering conditions/surroundings) and (E) (endangering conduct/course of conduct). The court also evaluated best interest under § 161.001(b)(2) using the Holley factors as nonexclusive guideposts and held the record supported the best-interest finding as to both parents (including Father, who challenged only best interest). The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment is proved—and sustained on appeal—through the cumulative story, not a single “bad fact.” If you’re pursuing or defending a termination (or litigating custody restrictions with endangerment themes), build and attack a record that ties specific unsafe conditions and a parent’s course of conduct to the child’s exposure to risk. Also, preserve and litigate grounds (D) and (E) directly: appellate courts must review challenged D/E findings, and those findings can follow a parent into future cases."
Daniel Cisneros Leyva v. The State of Texas
COA14
In a capital-murder/robbery appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether the State sufficiently corroborated an accomplice co-defendant’s testimony under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.14, and whether the jury should have been instructed that other witnesses were accomplices. Applying the required method—disregarding the accomplice’s testimony and examining the remaining record—the court held the corroboration threshold is modest: non-accomplice evidence need only “tend to connect” the accused to the offense, not independently prove every element. Here, the non-accomplice evidence included (1) witnesses placing the group together shortly before the offense, (2) the defendant’s own statements putting him at the scene, (3) descriptions of the shooter’s clothing and a laser-equipped gun consistent with the defendant’s admissions, (4) cell-phone location/communication evidence showing coordination and post-incident calls, and (5) inconsistencies/falsehoods in the defendant’s accounts. The court also affirmed the refusal to give accomplice-witness instructions for other witnesses because the record contained no evidence they participated in the charged capital murder/robbery; mere association, presence, or tangential benefit is not enough to make someone an accomplice for charge purposes.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case turns on one “insider” witness, don’t argue each corroborating fact must independently prove the whole story. Instead, focus the judge (or jury) on whether there are multiple independent circumstances that collectively *tend to connect* the accused to the alleged conduct (texts/calls, location data, third-party records, injuries/clothing/timeline congruence, and inconsistent denials). Conversely, resist attempts to discredit every supporting witness as “complicit” unless there is concrete evidence the witness participated in the *act alleged*, not just relationship drama or proximity."
In re L.C.
COA12
In a DFPS SAPCR, the adoptive parent sought mandamus relief attacking the trial court’s temporary/permanency orders—complaining of alleged Chapter 263 noncompliance, continued DFPS possession after an adversary hearing, and a sua sponte “aggravated circumstances” finding that waived reasonable-efforts and service-plan requirements. While the mandamus was pending, the court of appeals in an earlier original proceeding ordered the trial court to vacate its temporary order and return the children; the trial court complied. DFPS then moved to dismiss the underlying SAPCR and the trial court signed a dismissal order. The parent argued the mandamus was not moot because the aggravated-circumstances finding could cause collateral consequences in future DFPS cases, foster-care licensing/employment, and related criminal proceedings. The Tyler Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because intervening events eliminated any live controversy: the children had been returned and the DFPS case was dismissed, so no effectual mandamus relief remained. The court also rejected the collateral-consequences exception, reasoning that the challenged aggravated-circumstances language appeared only in nonfinal temporary/permanency orders, which do not preserve a justiciable controversy once the case is dismissed. The court dismissed the mandamus petition as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus jurisdiction can disappear fast in DFPS cases: once possession is restored and the underlying SAPCR is dismissed, appellate courts will usually treat challenges to temporary/permanency findings as moot. If you need to undo damaging interim language (like “aggravated circumstances”), press for immediate trial-court correction or expedited appellate relief while the case is still live; reputational or speculative future harms from nonfinal temporary orders typically won’t satisfy the narrow collateral-consequences exception."
Erique Howard v. The State of Texas
COA14
After a jury convicted Erique Howard of multiple felonies, he elected judge-assessed punishment. Before the punishment hearing, the trial judge discussed Howard’s punishment exposure, referenced prior plea positions, and suggested a post-verdict negotiation range. After a recess, the court imposed a 50-year sentence, stating it was “in accordance with the plea agreement,” and no one objected or filed a motion for new trial claiming coercion or vindictiveness. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not a resentencing after retrial, so Howard had to prove actual judicial vindictiveness from the record. The judge’s forceful comments and settlement-range discussion—paired with repeated disclaimers and a sentence matching the announced agreement—did not establish retaliation for exercising the right to trial. The court also held that complaints that the post-verdict sentencing agreement was involuntary, or that the trial court had to conduct an on-the-record voluntariness inquiry, were waived because Howard raised neither a contemporaneous objection nor a post-judgment motion developing those issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a judge “pushes a number” after a merits ruling, appellate courts often treat it as hard bargaining unless the record proves retaliation—and you still must preserve coercion/vindictiveness complaints immediately. If you believe a post-ruling agreement (Rule 11, parenting plan, property blueprint) was coerced, object on the record and follow up with a motion for new trial/to set aside that specifically pleads involuntariness and identifies the coercive statements; otherwise, the issue will likely be deemed waived."
Moises Galvan v. The State of Texas
COA08
In a bar‑shooting prosecution, Moises Galvan admitted shooting two men (killing one) but claimed self‑defense. After a mistrial in 2019, he was retried and convicted in 2023. On appeal, the El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed (1) claimed jury‑charge defects under Texas’s preservation‑dependent harm framework, (2) exclusion of a defense expert opinion under abuse‑of‑discretion gatekeeping and the need for a reliable, issue‑specific “fit” plus a proper offer of proof, (3) cumulative error, and (4) a Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial claim under the Barker v. Wingo balancing test. The court held Galvan failed to show reversible charge error or harm, the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding the defense expert (and any error was not shown harmful in light of the video/forensic and impeachment evidence), cumulative‑error relief was unavailable without multiple harmful errors, and the Barker factors did not warrant the drastic remedy of dismissal with prejudice despite the lengthy delay between indictment and retrial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Crossover lesson for family‑violence dockets: (1) If you need an expert to support a self‑defense/“reasonable perception” narrative, you must build a tight admissibility foundation and preserve the excluded opinion with a detailed offer of proof—otherwise exclusion will usually stand on appeal. (2) Delay‑based fairness arguments require a record of assertion of the right and concrete prejudice (lost evidence/witnesses, impaired presentation, child‑focused harm), not generalized complaints. (3) “Cumulative error” rarely rescues a case when each individual ruling fails on preservation, error, or harm."
Christopher Redin v. The State of Texas
COA06
In a criminal dating‑violence assault-by-occlusion trial, the defendant sought to keep out evidence that he had assaulted other dating partners in California and moved for mistrial when witnesses briefly referenced an “open case” and “similar charges” despite a motion in limine. The trial court held a pretrial hearing, deferred its final ruling, then—after the defense’s cross-examination created a misleading “false impression” about the defendant’s behavior and the nature of the incident—admitted the other-victim testimony as rebuttal evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), subject to Rule 403 balancing. The Sixth Court of Appeals held the trial court acted within its discretion: the extraneous assaults were admitted for a permissible non-character purpose (rebutting a false impression and providing context on disputed issues) and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court also affirmed denial of mistrial, concluding the brief references to an “open case”/“similar charges” were not so prejudicial as to be incurable and limine violations alone did not warrant the extraordinary remedy of mistrial.
Litigation Takeaway
"In protective-order and SAPCR trials, “character” themes can backfire. If your cross-examination suggests the violence was isolated, the applicant is exaggerating, or the respondent is “not that kind of person,” you may open the door to prior-partner abuse evidence under Rule 404(b) as rebuttal to a false impression—often surviving Rule 403. Also, a motion in limine is only a speed bump: be ready to object, move to strike, request an instruction, and build a record showing why any mention of other cases is incurable if you want a mistrial."
In the Interest of O.E.S., a Child
COA05
In a child support dispute under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a father appealed a trial court's refusal to vacate a support order issued following a previous remand. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that the father waived most of his appellate points by failing to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). His brief lacked specific citations to the record and coherent legal analysis, which the court held is fatal to an appeal regardless of whether a party is represented by an attorney. Additionally, the court applied the 'law of the case' doctrine to reject his jurisdictional challenge, as the issue of personal jurisdiction had already been settled in a prior appeal of the same litigation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural rules are just as important as the facts of your case; failing to properly cite the record or provide a clear legal argument in an appellate brief will result in a waiver of your claims. Furthermore, once a legal issue like jurisdiction is decided by an appellate court, the 'law of the case' doctrine typically prevents you from re-litigating that same issue later in the same proceeding."
In the Interest of C.B., D.N.B., and J.B., Children
COA06
In a DFPS Chapter 262 removal case filed in Panola County involving three children, the trial court signed an agreed final SAPCR order that adjudicated conservatorship and attempted to redirect child support for one child (Jarod). But a prior Denton County parentage order (and later modification) had already vested the Denton County district court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (CEJ) over all SAPCR matters “in connection with” Jarod. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that while the Panola County Chapter 262 court had authority to enter emergency and temporary orders in the county where the child was found, it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to render a final order affecting Jarod absent a pre-rendition transfer under Family Code Chapter 155/262. Because jurisdiction cannot be created by agreement and a post-judgment transfer does not retroactively cure the defect, the appellate court vacated the final order as to Jarod, affirmed the final order as to the other children, and affirmed the denial of Mother’s motion for new trial attacking the voluntariness of the agreed order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Continuing exclusive jurisdiction is a non-negotiable, early-case triage issue: if any child is already subject to a prior paternity/support/SAPCR order in another Texas court, your current court may issue only Chapter 262 emergency/temporary relief until a proper transfer occurs. You cannot “agree” around CEJ, you cannot redirect or modify support tied to the CEJ court without transfer, and a post-judgment transfer will not save a final order—creating a real risk of partial vacatur in multi-child decrees."
Mosser v. Flagstar Bank, FSB; Select Portfolio Servicing Inc.; First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
COA05
In a Texas homestead lending/foreclosure dispute, the borrower challenged a home-equity (“cash-out”) lien as constitutionally noncompliant and void and sought discovery from multiple entities in the loan/servicing chain. Defendants moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. The borrower filed a properly supported Rule 166a(g) motion for continuance explaining he needed basic, targeted discovery—foundational documents and testimony necessary to respond to the dispositive motions—especially after later-joined parties and procedural events effectively limited meaningful discovery time. The trial court denied the continuance and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals first rejected a post-submission jurisdiction/standing attack tied to a later-recorded “corrective” assignment, holding it still had appellate jurisdiction and that any assignment/standing issues could be addressed on remand. Turning to the merits, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 166a(g) continuance where the record showed the requested discovery was essential—not a fishing expedition—to oppose summary judgment. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court can’t force a party to lose on summary judgment while blocking the minimum discovery needed to respond. If you face early dispositive motions in a property-heavy case, preserve error with a verified, nonconclusory Rule 166a(g) continuance request that ties specific discovery to specific summary-judgment elements and demonstrates diligence—especially when key parties were added late or discovery time was functionally curtailed."
Timothy Ross v. The State of Texas
COA05
In a civil bond-forfeiture case, the State obtained a judgment nisi after Timothy Ross failed to appear. Within days, Ross—acting pro se—filed a document titled “Motion to Void Judgment Nisi,” which identified the case, provided his contact information, and substantively challenged the State’s entitlement to forfeiture. Despite that filing, the trial court signed a no‑answer default judgment. The Dallas Court of Appeals applied Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 71’s substance-over-caption principle and the appearance standard from Smith v. Lippmann, holding that Ross’s pro se motion functioned as a timely answer/appearance because it showed an intent to contest the relief sought and provided identifying/contact information. Because an “answer” was on file, Rule 239 did not permit a no‑answer default. The court reversed the default judgment and remanded for proceedings on the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the respondent files anything timely that identifies the case and disputes the requested relief—even a mislabeled pro se “motion” or letter—Texas courts must often treat it as an answer/appearance. That closes the door on a no‑answer default and triggers notice and an opportunity to be heard (crucial in protective orders, SAPCR modifications, and termination cases). Petitioners should docket-audit for any such filing and proceed, at most, under post‑answer default with proper notice and proof."