Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
863 opinions found
In the Interest of C.B., D.N.B., and J.B., Children
COA06
In a DFPS Chapter 262 removal case filed in Panola County involving three children, the trial court signed an agreed final SAPCR order that adjudicated conservatorship and attempted to redirect child support for one child (Jarod). But a prior Denton County parentage order (and later modification) had already vested the Denton County district court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (CEJ) over all SAPCR matters “in connection with” Jarod. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that while the Panola County Chapter 262 court had authority to enter emergency and temporary orders in the county where the child was found, it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to render a final order affecting Jarod absent a pre-rendition transfer under Family Code Chapter 155/262. Because jurisdiction cannot be created by agreement and a post-judgment transfer does not retroactively cure the defect, the appellate court vacated the final order as to Jarod, affirmed the final order as to the other children, and affirmed the denial of Mother’s motion for new trial attacking the voluntariness of the agreed order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Continuing exclusive jurisdiction is a non-negotiable, early-case triage issue: if any child is already subject to a prior paternity/support/SAPCR order in another Texas court, your current court may issue only Chapter 262 emergency/temporary relief until a proper transfer occurs. You cannot “agree” around CEJ, you cannot redirect or modify support tied to the CEJ court without transfer, and a post-judgment transfer will not save a final order—creating a real risk of partial vacatur in multi-child decrees."
Christopher Redin v. The State of Texas
COA06
In a criminal dating‑violence assault-by-occlusion trial, the defendant sought to keep out evidence that he had assaulted other dating partners in California and moved for mistrial when witnesses briefly referenced an “open case” and “similar charges” despite a motion in limine. The trial court held a pretrial hearing, deferred its final ruling, then—after the defense’s cross-examination created a misleading “false impression” about the defendant’s behavior and the nature of the incident—admitted the other-victim testimony as rebuttal evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), subject to Rule 403 balancing. The Sixth Court of Appeals held the trial court acted within its discretion: the extraneous assaults were admitted for a permissible non-character purpose (rebutting a false impression and providing context on disputed issues) and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court also affirmed denial of mistrial, concluding the brief references to an “open case”/“similar charges” were not so prejudicial as to be incurable and limine violations alone did not warrant the extraordinary remedy of mistrial.
Litigation Takeaway
"In protective-order and SAPCR trials, “character” themes can backfire. If your cross-examination suggests the violence was isolated, the applicant is exaggerating, or the respondent is “not that kind of person,” you may open the door to prior-partner abuse evidence under Rule 404(b) as rebuttal to a false impression—often surviving Rule 403. Also, a motion in limine is only a speed bump: be ready to object, move to strike, request an instruction, and build a record showing why any mention of other cases is incurable if you want a mistrial."
In the Interest of O.E.S., a Child
COA05
In a child support dispute under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a father appealed a trial court's refusal to vacate a support order issued following a previous remand. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that the father waived most of his appellate points by failing to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). His brief lacked specific citations to the record and coherent legal analysis, which the court held is fatal to an appeal regardless of whether a party is represented by an attorney. Additionally, the court applied the 'law of the case' doctrine to reject his jurisdictional challenge, as the issue of personal jurisdiction had already been settled in a prior appeal of the same litigation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural rules are just as important as the facts of your case; failing to properly cite the record or provide a clear legal argument in an appellate brief will result in a waiver of your claims. Furthermore, once a legal issue like jurisdiction is decided by an appellate court, the 'law of the case' doctrine typically prevents you from re-litigating that same issue later in the same proceeding."
Texas A&M University–Commerce and Texas A&M University System v. Chandler Donaway
COA05
A student-athlete sued university entities and others for alleged negligent athletic training and delayed/improper medical treatment after an ankle injury, asserting health care liability claims that required a Texas Chapter 74 expert report. The trial court overruled the universities’ objections and denied their partial motion to dismiss, but on interlocutory appeal the Dallas Court of Appeals strictly applied § 74.351 and the Palacios/Bowie/Jelinek line, emphasizing the “four corners” rule and that “good faith” is an objective sufficiency test. Because the plaintiff’s expert report did not state defendant-specific standards of care, identify what each university entity did or failed to do that breached those standards, or provide a nonconclusory causal chain linking those breaches to the complained-of injuries, it was not an “objective good-faith effort.” The court reversed the order overruling objections/denying dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Conclusory medical-causation narratives don’t survive early gatekeeping: whether you’re attacking or offering expert proof, make it actor-specific and element-by-element—(1) the applicable standard/benchmark, (2) the specific deviation by that party, and (3) a reasoned, non-inferential causal chain. If the court has to “fill gaps” to connect the dots, the report (or letter/affidavit) is vulnerable to being struck or dismissed."
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA05
In a juvenile delinquency jury trial for indecency with a child by contact, jurors reported that a State investigator seated in the gallery as the child complainant’s “support” repeatedly used gestures (e.g., “thumbs up,” motions to look at him, refocusing cues) that functionally coached the child during live testimony. The Fifth Court of Appeals analyzed the conduct as State-sponsored interference with the juvenile’s right to confrontation and meaningful cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment and Texas Constitution art. I, § 10, emphasizing that confrontation protects not just physical presence but an opportunity to test credibility free from real-time outside shaping. Applying constitutional harm review, the court held the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the child’s testimony was central and credibility-driven, and the jury’s evaluation was tainted by observed prompting from a State agent. The court reversed the adjudication and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a child witness is testifying, a “support person” cannot become a coach. If any aligned adult is visible to the child and signals, gestures, or otherwise prompts answers during testimony, object and demand an immediate inquiry; build a record (including juror/counsel affidavits if discovered later) and seek striking testimony, mistrial/new trial, or appellate reversal. In family cases, use the same due-process/credibility framework to challenge the reliability of child testimony or statements and to request prophylactic courtroom controls (neutral support, no line-of-sight, no signaling, on-the-record admonishments)."
Diamond Hydraulics, Inc. v. GAC Equipment, LLC d/b/a Austin Crane Service
SCOTX
In a commercial breach-of-contract/warranty dispute where causation turned on expert engineering testimony, the defendant timely designated an expert but, after multiple resets, its testifying expert became unavailable shortly before trial due to a job change, relocation out of state, and an express refusal to testify. The defendant promptly notified the other side and moved to substitute another engineer from the same firm who had helped prepare the report, offering to limit the substitute to the same opinions. The trial court excluded the substitute under Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6, denied continuances, and forced the defendant to try the case with no causation expert; the jury returned a plaintiff’s verdict and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court held that Rule 193.6’s “good cause” exception, while demanding, is not an “impossible” standard, and that the trial court misapplied the rule by rigidly denying substitution when the unavailability was outside the party’s control and the party acted promptly and in good faith to mitigate any prejudice. Because the exclusion was effectively case-dispositive in an expert-driven case, the error was reversible; the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a properly designated expert becomes genuinely unavailable near trial (job change, relocation, refusal to testify), don’t assume you’re stuck: act immediately, document the unavailability, offer a true substitute with the same opinions, and propose cure measures (deposition/limited continuance). Courts cannot weaponize Rule 193.6 deadlines to force trial without essential expert proof when the problem is outside your control and you move diligently."
In the Interest of D.R.S., a Child
COA07
In a parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appointed appellate counsel sought to withdraw after briefing due to a newly arising, irreconcilable conflict of interest caused by new employment. Recognizing that termination appeals are accelerated and implicate the parent’s right to effective representation, the Seventh Court of Appeals held it could not proceed on the merits without a trial-court ruling and an adequate record regarding the conflict and any need for substitute counsel. The court therefore abated the appeal, suspended appellate deadlines, and remanded to the trial court to rule on withdrawal, decide whether substitute appellate counsel must be appointed, and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, with a supplemental clerk’s and reporter’s record due by a set expedited deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law appeals—especially parental-termination cases—an attorney conflict is a threshold issue that can halt the appeal. Raise conflicts immediately and build a clear trial-court record (order, findings, and hearing record) on withdrawal and substitution, or the appellate court may abate the case and suspend deadlines until representation issues are resolved."
In re M.S.
COA02
In a modification of a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) between a mother and a nonparent former partner, the trial court initially maintained the nonparent's joint managing conservatorship and possession rights over the mother’s objection. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, applying the "fit-parent presumption" established in In re C.J.C., held that a trial court cannot grant or continue a nonparent's possession or conservatorship rights over a fit parent's objection without evidence of extraordinary circumstances or parental unfitness. Finding that the record consisted primarily of interpersonal conflict rather than evidence of significant harm to the child, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"Temporary orders are a critical constitutional battleground in parent-vs-nonparent disputes. Litigators must treat the "fit-parent presumption" as the controlling standard from the outset; a nonparent cannot rely on the "status quo" or "best interest" alone to maintain rights, but must instead prove extraordinary circumstances to overcome a fit parent's objection."
C. R. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In a bench-trial termination case, the mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting endangerment grounds and the best-interest finding after she led police on a late-night, 100+ mph chase with her three young children in the car and the Department removed the children. The Third Court of Appeals evaluated the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and viewed the evidence cumulatively, not as a single-incident lapse. It held that the high-speed flight, combined with the children’s unstable living conditions (sleeping and eating in the car, poor hygiene and inadequate clothing), outstanding felony warrants (including custodial interference), and unresolved mental-health/substance-use concerns supported findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (endangering conditions) and (E) (endangering conduct). Applying the Holley best-interest framework, the court emphasized the children’s stability and improvement in a Kentucky placement, concerns that the mother’s hostile communications destabilized the placement and the children, and the mother’s failure to document sobriety/treatment after moving out of state. The court affirmed termination, upheld the finding that the Department made reasonable reunification efforts despite the mother’s relocation, and affirmed appointment of the Department as permanent managing conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
"High-risk conduct that exposes children to danger—even without physical injury—can support termination and heavily influence custody outcomes, especially when paired with instability, unresolved mental-health/substance issues, and combative communications that harm the children’s emotional stability. If a parent moves out of state during a CPS/SAPCR case, they must proactively secure admissible proof of service completion and sobriety; courts will not treat the move as shifting the agency’s duty to fund or arrange out-of-state services."
In the Interest of J.D., R.D.-G., K.G., and L.G., Children
COA02
In this case, the Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father following reports of drug use, child abandonment, and instability. The Father, who was incarcerated for deadly conduct throughout the case, challenged the trial court's finding that termination was in the children's best interest. Mother’s court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, signaling that her appeal lacked nonfrivolous legal issues. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the record under the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, focusing on Father's history of incarceration, his minimization of Mother’s drug issues, and the children’s successful bonding within their foster placements. The court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding and affirmed the termination of both parents' rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest determinations often hinge on a parent's credibility and insight. Minimizing risks—such as ignoring a partner's drug use or failing to provide a concrete timeline for stability—can be fatal to a parent's case. For parents facing litigation, demonstrating accountability and providing a realistic, child-centered plan for the present is far more persuasive than making aspirational promises for the future."