Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
847 opinions found
Andy Jerome Williams v. The State of Texas
COA09
In a drug-trafficking prosecution arising from cocaine found in a concealed “trap” in a truck the defendant was driving, the defendant sought to shift blame to a third party (the truck’s insured) by offering evidence that the third party was arrested about ten months later for a similar, high-quantity cocaine offense with sophisticated concealment. The trial court excluded the third party’s later arrest under Texas Rule of Evidence 403, finding the time gap and attenuated connection created only marginal probative value while inviting juror confusion and a distracting “mini-trial” about the unrelated arrest. The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding alternative-perpetrator evidence must have a sufficiently direct nexus to the charged event; thematic similarity and a loose association to the vehicle were not enough. The court further held the exclusion did not violate the constitutional right to present a complete defense because standard evidentiary limits, applied neutrally, may bar speculative third-party culpability theories.
Litigation Takeaway
"“Someone else did it” evidence is admissible only if you can show a concrete, case-specific connection to the incident at issue. Remote-in-time arrests or similar bad acts of a third person—without direct nexus (access, control, presence, digital/financial connectors, etc.)—are prime candidates for exclusion under Rule 403 as confusing, time-consuming, and minimally probative, and their exclusion generally will not amount to a constitutional denial of a defense."
In the Interest of J.E.H., a Child
COA07
In a Department of Family and Protective Services termination suit involving a fifteen-year-old, Mother appealed only the trial court’s best-interest finding. The Amarillo Court of Appeals applied the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest framework, noting that unchallenged predicate findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1) (endangering conditions/endangerment/constructive abandonment) were binding on appeal and could be considered as best-interest evidence. The record showed Mother provided unsafe and unstable housing with inconsistent utilities and unsanitary conditions, failed to ensure the child’s medical and educational needs were met, had minimal visitation and support during the year-long case, and did not complete key service-plan requirements (including parenting classes and counseling). By contrast, the child was thriving in a stable placement, expressed discomfort with visits, and wanted to remain with the caregiver. Rejecting Mother’s argument that termination punished poverty/disability, the court focused on concrete safety and caregiving deficiencies and affirmed that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest under § 161.001(b)(2).
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won with specific, child-centered proof of safety, stability, and follow-through over time—not generalized hardship arguments. Service-plan noncompliance, minimal contact/support, and unsafe or unstable housing can carry the best-interest finding, especially when contrasted with a child’s documented progress and stated preference for a stable placement; and on appeal, unchallenged predicate grounds will be treated as established and can powerfully support best interest."
In the Interest of C.R., a Child
COA04
In a Guadalupe County divorce, the mother alleged a history or pattern of family violence/abuse/neglect and sought to be appointed sole managing conservator with the father denied possession and access (or, alternatively, supervised access). A jury trial on conservatorship resulted in findings (under a preponderance standard in the charge) that the mother should be sole managing conservator and that the father should not be appointed a possessory conservator. At the charge conference, the father affirmatively stated he had “no objections.” The trial court then rendered a decree appointing the mother sole managing conservator and denying the father any possession or access, with findings that access would endanger the child and was not in the child’s best interest. On appeal, the father argued the preponderance instruction was unconstitutional because a no-access decree is “tantamount to termination” and should require clear-and-convincing evidence, and also contended the submission improperly asked the jury to decide an impermissible “term or condition” of possession/access under Tex. Fam. Code § 105.002(c)(2)(B). The Fourth Court treated both arguments as unpreserved jury-charge complaints: by stating “no objections,” the father waived charge error, and the court declined to apply fundamental-error review, noting that even in actual termination cases the Supreme Court requires preservation and that conservatorship orders—unlike termination—remain modifiable (distinguishing cases like *Stary* tied to protective orders). The court further concluded the jury was asked to decide conservatorship status (permissible), and because the jury refused to place the father in any conservatorship role, the trial court properly denied possession and access as a consequence of that status determination. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a conservatorship submission sets up a potential “no access” outcome, you must preserve error at the charge conference—object to the burden of proof and the form of the questions and obtain rulings. Saying “no objections” will almost certainly waive appellate review, and courts will not rescue the issue by rebranding it as fundamental error or “de facto termination.”"
Daniel Matthew Bible v. The State of Texas
COA03
In this criminal appeal with family-law crossover implications, the defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an indecency-with-a-child-by-contact conviction as to alleged “breast” touching. Although the complainant initially answered “No” when asked directly whether her breast was touched and described the contact as stopping at the “bra line,” the court reviewed the entire record under the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the jury’s role as factfinder. The jury saw the complainant demonstrate the hand movement across her chest and reviewed an admitted body diagram she highlighted to show the area touched. A forensic interviewer testified that the complainant’s “bra line” demonstration included the breast, and a forensic nurse explained that young children have breast tissue and that the highlighted area encompassed the breasts. Considering the demonstrations, diagram, and corroborating contextual evidence, the Third Court of Appeals held a rational juror could find breast contact beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don’t assume a witness’s damaging sound-bite answer (e.g., “No, he didn’t touch my breast”) defeats an abuse allegation when the testimony includes location descriptors (“bra line”), in-court demonstrations, and marked diagrams. Courts can treat demonstrative evidence—especially when supported by CAC/forensic interviewer and medical testimony—as enough to prove anatomically specific contact, and factfinders may credit that totality over semantic inconsistencies. In custody/protective-order litigation, build (or attack) the foundation and clarity of diagrams/gestures and the “translator” testimony that links imprecise language to legally significant anatomy."
In the Interest of T.C.C. and B.D.C., Children
COA05
After a bench trial, the judge orally rendered that Father would pay guideline child support based on minimum-wage net resources and reimburse Mother for the children’s portion of health-insurance premiums. The written final divorce decree signed shortly after trial contained lower child-support numbers and omitted any reimbursement obligation. Months later—after the trial court’s plenary power expired—Mother moved for a judgment nunc pro tunc to correct the decree to match the oral rendition. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the dispute as a clerical “rendition-versus-entry” problem: because the reporter’s record showed the court had already rendered guideline child support on minimum-wage earnings and ordered premium reimbursement, the later written decree’s inconsistent numbers and omission were clerical mistakes in memorializing the judgment, not a new judicial decision. The court held the trial court could correct those clerical errors by nunc pro tunc at any time, and it affirmed the corrected child-support amounts and added medical-support reimbursement term. The court also dismissed Father’s challenges to unrelated provisions (protective order, conservatorship, homestead sale) for lack of jurisdiction because an appeal from a nunc pro tunc judgment reaches only the nunc pro tunc corrections, not issues that could have been appealed from the original decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the signed decree doesn’t match what the judge said on the record, a nunc pro tunc can fix true clerical discrepancies—even after plenary power expires—but it cannot be used to make new judicial changes. Also, appealing a nunc pro tunc order does not reopen the whole divorce; appellate review is limited to the corrections actually made, so missing the original appeal deadline can be fatal to other complaints."
Daniel Kenneth Meek v. The State of Texas
COA09
In a family-violence assault prosecution, the State and its witnesses repeatedly referred to the complainant (and domestic violence complainants generally) as the “victim.” Defense counsel objected once—arguing the person was only a “complaining witness” because it had not been established she was a victim—but did not clearly invoke due process/presumption-of-innocence grounds and did not object again as the terminology continued throughout trial. On appeal, the defendant reframed the complaint as a constitutional due-process/fair-trial violation. The Ninth Court of Appeals analyzed the issue as an error-preservation question under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and the Marin/Clark/Broxton line of cases, explaining that even constitutional fair-trial complaints are generally forfeitable and must be preserved by timely, specific objections that comport with the theory urged on appeal, and renewed when the complained-of matter recurs (Fuentes). Because the single trial objection was not sufficiently specific/constitutional and was not renewed with each later use of “victim,” the court held the complaint was forfeited and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If opposing counsel or witnesses repeatedly label someone a “victim” before any finding of wrongdoing, you must preserve the issue with precision: object early, state the exact legal basis you intend to raise (due process/presumption of innocence, improper bolstering/opinion, Rule 403 unfair prejudice, etc.), get a ruling, and either secure a clear running objection or object each time the term is used. One vague objection will not preserve a later constitutional appellate complaint."
Payne v. Boyd
COA04
In Payne v. Boyd, a nonlawyer brother (Donald) attempted to prosecute a lawsuit for the named plaintiff (Darrell) based on a power of attorney arising from Darrell’s pending criminal matter. Defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction asserting Donald lacked capacity and standing. The Fourth Court of Appeals distinguished capacity (a procedural defect that must be raised by verified pleading under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93) from standing (a jurisdictional requirement that can be raised by plea to the jurisdiction and is not waivable). Because defendants did not file a Rule 93 verified pleading, any capacity challenge was waived. But Donald still lacked standing because he pleaded no personal injury to himself and could not manufacture standing by claiming agency under a POA to assert Darrell’s constitutional/statutory claims. The standing defect deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction, and dismissal was proper without leave to replead because the defect was incurable as to Donald.
Litigation Takeaway
"A power of attorney is not a license to litigate. Even if the other side fails to preserve a Rule 93 verified “capacity” objection, you can still knock out proxy-driven filings by attacking standing with a plea to the jurisdiction—standing is nonwaivable and requires the filer to allege their own concrete injury. Preserve both: verified Rule 93 capacity challenge + plea to the jurisdiction on standing."
In re Jesus Ybarra
COA07
In an adult parentage suit, the trial court ordered the alleged father (relator) to submit to genetic testing. Although he sought a stay and obtained a written order plus findings and conclusions, he did not file for mandamus until almost a year later—after the court issued a renewed testing deadline and warned noncompliance could lead to contempt. The Seventh Court of Appeals treated mandamus as an equity-governed remedy and held the unexplained delay was unreasonable and barred relief; a later contempt warning did not “restart the clock” or create new mandamus issues because the relator’s statutory/constitutional complaints (retroactivity, privacy, due process) were the same when the original testing order was issued. The court also rejected the relator’s request to prospectively prohibit a future contempt proceeding on double-jeopardy grounds as unripe and an impermissible advisory opinion. Mandamus was denied without reaching the merits of the challenges to the testing order.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you plan to challenge a genetic-testing (or other intrusive, effectively unreviewable) family-law order by mandamus, act fast—equity favors the diligent, and waiting until enforcement ramps up or contempt is threatened is often too late. Contempt warnings usually don’t reset mandamus deadlines, and appellate courts won’t pre-approve defenses to hypothetical future contempt proceedings."
In the Interest of M.Z. and M.C.Z., Children
COA05
In a Dallas County divorce after a 23-year marriage, the community estate included the husband’s executive deferred-compensation “performance units,” which would pay only upon future contingent events (e.g., IPO, dividend, sale) and could be forfeited. The only valuation evidence was uncontroverted expert CPA testimony that the units had no presently ascertainable fair market value as of trial, but were not worthless and could be divided in kind. The trial court nevertheless treated the units as 100% community property, awarded 100% of them to the husband, and assigned a $0 value in the just-and-right division. Applying the abuse-of-discretion framework with embedded legal-sufficiency review under Texas Family Code § 7.001, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that evidence showing “no current calculable FMV” does not support a finding of “no value,” and the record contained no affirmative evidence that the units were worthless. Because the performance units were a material portion of the community estate, the erroneous $0 valuation tainted the overall division. The court reversed the property division and remanded for a new, proper division of the community estate (affirming the divorce otherwise).
Litigation Takeaway
"Contingent does not mean worthless. If an asset can’t be reliably valued today (executive compensation, earnouts, carried interests, options), a court cannot simply assign $0 without evidence of actual worthlessness—especially if it awards the entire asset to one spouse. Build a record that either (1) proves worthlessness, or (2) supports a division-in-kind or other non-speculative mechanism, and tie any valuation error to overall “just and right” harm when the asset is material."
In the Interest of I.R.R., a Child
COA05
In a restricted appeal from a default SAPCR, Father argued the judgment was void for defective service and, alternatively, unsupported by evidence. The Dallas Court of Appeals first examined the face of the record for strict compliance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 106 and 107 and held the return of service adequately identified Father and what was served; Rule 107 did not require the served petition/exhibits to be attached to the return in the clerk’s file, so the trial court had personal jurisdiction. The court then reviewed the default prove-up evidence and concluded it was legally insufficient to establish Father’s net resources, making both the guideline-based current support order and the retroactive support judgment unsustainable. Finally, the court held the record was factually insufficient to overcome the Family Code presumption that joint managing conservatorship is in the child’s best interest; the prove-up lacked substantive best-interest evidence justifying Mother as sole managing conservator with Father as possessory conservator. The court reversed the SAPCR order and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even in a default SAPCR with airtight service, you still must build a real evidentiary record: prove net resources (and show the guideline math) for current and retroactive support, and present concrete best-interest facts to rebut the joint-managing presumption if seeking a sole-managing conservatorship. For respondents, restricted appeals often succeed on sufficiency problems in thin prove-ups rather than on service defects."