Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
847 opinions found
In the Interest of I.R.R., a Child
COA05
In a restricted appeal from a default SAPCR, Father argued the judgment was void for defective service and, alternatively, unsupported by evidence. The Dallas Court of Appeals first examined the face of the record for strict compliance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 106 and 107 and held the return of service adequately identified Father and what was served; Rule 107 did not require the served petition/exhibits to be attached to the return in the clerk’s file, so the trial court had personal jurisdiction. The court then reviewed the default prove-up evidence and concluded it was legally insufficient to establish Father’s net resources, making both the guideline-based current support order and the retroactive support judgment unsustainable. Finally, the court held the record was factually insufficient to overcome the Family Code presumption that joint managing conservatorship is in the child’s best interest; the prove-up lacked substantive best-interest evidence justifying Mother as sole managing conservator with Father as possessory conservator. The court reversed the SAPCR order and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even in a default SAPCR with airtight service, you still must build a real evidentiary record: prove net resources (and show the guideline math) for current and retroactive support, and present concrete best-interest facts to rebut the joint-managing presumption if seeking a sole-managing conservatorship. For respondents, restricted appeals often succeed on sufficiency problems in thin prove-ups rather than on service defects."
In the Interest of M.Z. and M.C.Z., Children
COA05
In a divorce case, the trial court’s final decree required the wife to sell a New Mexico residence for “fair market value.” The husband later sought enforcement and a receiver; the trial court found the decree too indefinite for contempt but issued a post-judgment “clarification order” defining “fair market value” and awarding the husband attorney’s fees and costs. While that clarification-order appeal was pending, the Dallas Court of Appeals in a separate appeal partially reversed and remanded the community-property division of the same divorce decree due to a valuation error involving performance units. Because the clarification order was tethered to the now-reversed/remanded property-division framework, any decision about the decree’s ambiguity or the propriety of the clarification would not affect the parties’ rights going forward, making the appeal moot. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and vacated the clarification order in full, including the fee and cost award.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you pursue (or defend) clarification/enforcement orders while the property division is on appeal, a later partial reversal/remand of the decree can render those post-judgment orders moot and wipe out associated attorney’s-fee awards. Manage parallel proceedings carefully, consider sequencing/abatement, and preserve independent bases for fees and relief that can survive changes to the underlying decree."
In the Interest of Z.P., a Child
COA05
In a child-support enforcement action, the mother sought confirmation of arrears and a cumulative money judgment “plus interest,” along with attorney’s fees. Before the enforcement hearing, the father paid the arrearage principal ($25,420) through the OAG, and the trial court confirmed the arrears as paid and awarded $8,766.65 in attorney’s fees/costs but omitted any interest from the cumulative money judgment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 157.263 makes interest on confirmed child-support arrearages mandatory when a money judgment is requested; the trial court’s role is essentially mechanical once arrears are confirmed, and a pretrial payment of principal does not eliminate accrued statutory interest. The court reversed and remanded for the limited purpose of adding interest on the previously accrued $25,420 arrearage amount, while affirming the reduced attorney’s-fee award because reasonableness remains a fact issue within the trial court’s discretion even when the fee evidence is uncontroverted.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas child-support enforcement, don’t let a last-minute payment of arrears principal lull you into thinking the case is over—if you plead for a money judgment, interest under Family Code § 157.263 is mandatory and an order that omits it is reversible. Also, even strong, uncontroverted fee proof doesn’t guarantee the full amount requested; position “reasonableness” and tie the work to enforcement necessity if you want the court to award all fees."
Renove Medical Spa, PLLC & Afia Naqvi, M.D. v. Charlotte Elizondo
COA14
Charlotte Elizondo sued Renove Medical Spa and Dr. Afia Naqvi for negligence after a facial injection led to a life-threatening infection. Under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA), Elizondo served an expert report from a nurse practitioner. The defendants waited over a year to object, arguing the nurse was unqualified to opine on a doctor's standard of care and that the report was therefore legally nonexistent (a "no report" scenario). The court analyzed whether a report by an unqualified expert is a jurisdictional nullity or a "deficient" report subject to waiver. Applying Texas Supreme Court precedent, the court held that qualification challenges are sufficiency objections that must be raised within the TMLA’s 21-day statutory window. Because the defendants missed this deadline, they waived their challenge, and the denial of their motion to dismiss was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas litigation, "unqualified" does not mean "nonexistent." If an opponent serves an expert report—whether in a medical malpractice case or a child custody dispute—any challenge to that expert's credentials must be made promptly. Failing to object within statutory or procedural deadlines (like the TMLA’s 21-day window) waives the objection, potentially allowing a "deficient" expert to remain the anchor of the case."
Osbaldo Gonzales v. The State of Texas
COA07
In a single-count aggravated sexual assault of a child case alleging digital penetration, the child and outcry witness testified the act happened “twice.” The defendant argued this created a material variance from the one-count indictment and raised double-jeopardy concerns because it was unclear which incident supported the conviction. The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected the variance framing, holding the proof matched the indictment’s elements (digital penetration) and the record did not clearly establish two distinct criminal episodes (the “twice” testimony could describe multiple penetrations within one encounter). The court explained that if the evidence could be read as multiple discrete acts, the proper doctrine is jury unanimity/state election—not variance—and that complaint must be preserved by requesting an election or a specific unanimity instruction. Because the defense requested neither, any election/unanimity complaint was waived. The court also noted that when no election is made and multiple incidents are tried under one count, double jeopardy can bar later prosecution of either incident placed in evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a child’s testimony suggests “more than once” conduct under a single-count sexual-assault indictment, don’t mislabel it as a “variance” argument. If you need the State pinned to one episode, you must timely demand an election or a tailored unanimity instruction; otherwise the issue is waived on appeal. Strategically, declining to force election may actually expand double-jeopardy protection and prevent later charges based on other incidents mentioned at trial—an important consideration in parallel family-law cases that rely on criminal-case records."
Townsen Memorial Hospital, Southeast Texas Medical Ventures LLC d/b/a Townsen Memorial Hospital, and Markus Baloney, RN v. Cedric Wheeler
COA01
In a Texas health-care-liability suit arising from post-operative spinal-surgery complications, the plaintiff served a Chapter 74 expert report from a board-certified neurosurgeon who criticized the hospital’s nursing care (monitoring, documentation, recognition of cauda equina red flags, and escalation/communication). The hospital challenged the physician’s qualifications to opine on nursing standards and argued the report was insufficient on standard of care, breach, and causation; the trial court allowed a cure and then overruled the objections. After a nurse was added as a defendant, he was served with the amended report but did not object within the statutory 21-day window; about 18 months later he sought dismissal by labeling the report “no report” as to him because it did not name him specifically. The First Court of Appeals applied the Chapter 74 “threshold screening” and abuse-of-discretion framework and, within the report’s four corners, held the trial court could reasonably find the neurosurgeon qualified because his training and experience showed familiarity with the same type of postoperative spinal/neurologic monitoring and escalation issues at the heart of the nursing allegations. The court also held the amended report was a good-faith effort that adequately summarized the nursing standard of care, alleged breaches, and a causal pathway sufficient for early-stage Chapter 74 purposes. Finally, the court treated the later-added nurse’s “no report” theory as a timeliness/waiver problem: because he was served and failed to object within 21 days, the late dismissal attack was waived. The denial of dismissal was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expert fights are won (or lost) on two points: (1) qualifications turn on whether the expert has concrete experience with the same type of task/analysis at issue—not just whether the expert shares the opponent’s job title; and (2) timing is everything—if you don’t challenge an expert promptly under the governing deadline, courts are likely to find waiver even if you repackage the argument as “this isn’t an expert opinion at all.”"
Gary P. Joseph v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this criminal appeal with frequent spillover into Texas family-law cases alleging sexual abuse, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of alleged sexual assaults and sexualized conduct beyond the charged time period—including acts occurring after the complainant turned 18—and whether those evidentiary rulings required reversal of a conviction for the lesser-included offense of sexual assault of a child (age 14–17). The court applied a plain-text construction of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37 and held that the statute’s “gateway” requirement turns on the offense being prosecuted (a qualifying sexual offense committed against a child under 17), not on the complainant’s age at the time of the extraneous acts. Because the prosecution alleged a qualifying Chapter 22 offense committed when the complainant was under 17, article 38.37, §1(b) permitted evidence of other acts against the same victim to show relevant matters, including the “previous and subsequent relationship” between the defendant and the child-victim, even if some acts occurred after the complainant reached adulthood. The court further concluded the challenged admission/exclusion rulings (including embedded Rule 403 unfair-prejudice arguments) did not amount to reversible error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and the jury’s lesser-included conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When sexual-abuse allegations involve a long-running pattern, courts may allow “relationship narrative” evidence that extends beyond the child’s minority—so an “they were over 18 then” objection, standing alone, is often weak. In family cases (SAPCR, modifications, protective orders), build or attack the case on relevance, specificity, corroboration (outcry chronology, travel/records), and prejudice/mini-trial concerns, and treat SANE/DNA-type proof as potentially decisive at early hearings unless met with competent expert analysis."
Butler v. Taylor
COA01
In a bench-tried divorce, the husband appealed complaining the trial court failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law and challenging the decree’s property division (including a townhome), conservatorship/possession provisions, and child-support ruling. The First Court of Appeals held the husband waived any complaint about missing findings because, although he timely requested findings under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296, he did not timely file a Rule 297 notice of past-due findings. Without findings, the appellate court implied all facts necessary to support the judgment and reviewed the decree under the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Applying inception of title, the court concluded the record supported treating the Yorktown Meadow Lane townhome as the wife’s separate property because she acquired it before marriage; the husband’s testimony that he paid down the mortgage did not change characterization and did not establish a separate-property reimbursement/tracing claim (and the trial court could credit testimony that the payoff was intended as a gift). The court also rejected the husband’s conservatorship/possession and child-support complaints, noting broad trial-court discretion and that portions of the husband’s briefing were inadequately developed and thus waived. The divorce decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a Texas bench-tried divorce, calendar Rule 296/297 deadlines with zero slack: a late Rule 297 past-due notice waives the right to findings and forces the appeal into implied-findings territory, where the court will presume facts supporting the decree. Also, property-characterization and reimbursement claims live or die on proof—deeds for inception of title, tracing documents for the source of funds, and clear evidence on gift vs. reimbursement intent—because abuse-of-discretion review plus implied findings makes reversal unlikely."
In re West Fork Group, LLC
COA14
A trial court orally granted a motion for new trial and recorded the decision in a docket entry within the required timeframe, but it failed to sign a written order until after its 'plenary power' (jurisdictional authority) had expired. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b, a motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law if a written order is not signed within 75 days of the judgment, and the court’s power to act ends 30 days after that. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Supreme Court precedent and held that oral pronouncements and docket entries cannot substitute for a signed written order. Because the written order was signed after the 105-day deadline, it was void, and the court granted mandamus relief to vacate all orders entered after the deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas litigation, a judge's oral ruling 'from the bench' is not legally binding for the purpose of extending court deadlines—only a signed, written order counts. If you are seeking a new trial, you must ensure the judge signs the written order before the 75-day 'operation of law' deadline; otherwise, you hit a jurisdictional cliff that can render all subsequent wins void and reinstate the original judgment."
Members Choice Credit Union v. Juan Menjivar
COA14
Members Choice Credit Union (MCCU) sued Juan Menjivar for a deficiency balance following a vehicle repossession. Before trial, the court excluded MCCU's business records because they were not served 14 days in advance as required for self-authentication under Rule 902(10). Despite presenting a witness at trial, MCCU failed to re-offer the documents or make an 'offer of proof' on the record. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's take-nothing judgment, holding that without a reporter’s record or a formal bill of exception showing what the excluded evidence was, the appellate court must presume the trial court’s ruling was correct.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning on appeal requires more than just being right; it requires a complete record. If a judge excludes critical evidence like bank statements or medical records, you must immediately make an 'offer of proof' on the record or file a 'formal bill of exception.' Without these steps, the appellate court will assume the trial judge was right, even if the documents should have been admitted."